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The intersection between legal ethics and international criminal law has largely
been unexamined. This Article addresses the topic by focusing on certain
controversial actions taken by the Office of the Prosecutor ("OTP") of the
International Criminal Court ("ICC" or "Court") in connection with the Lubanga
and Al-Bashir cases.
Although the ICC has adopted codes of conduct for judges and defense counsel,
the OTP has no specific ethics code. This is problematic because the ICC Statute
imposes conflicting obligations on the ICC Prosecutor, and, as this Article will show,
the Prosecutor has resolved his conflicting obligations in the Lubanga and Al-Bashir
cases in ways that have undermined the ICC's credibility.
A code of conduct cannot eliminate prosecutorial discretion. Nor can it ensure
that ICC prosecutors always will act ethically. Nevertheless, this Article argues that
the approach of relying on Chambers to determine whether the Prosecutor has acted
appropriately has delayed proceedings and provides insufficient guidance to the
OTP. A preferable approach would be to provide prospective guidance to the OTP
in managing its conflicting duties through a code of conduct. This Article also
proposes specific rules that may mitigate some of the conflicts that already have
arisen in the ICC's first cases.
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INTRODUCTION
International criminal trials are different from domestic trials in significant
ways: the crimes for which defendants are tried are so heinous that they are of
international concern,' the procedures used by international criminal tribunals are a
hybrid of those found in common law and civil law countries,2 and the tribunals
themselves are staffed by lawyers and judges from a highly diverse group of nations
and legal cultures.' International criminal trials are also inherently political because
1. See Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-621, Decision on Article 54(3)(e) Documents
Identified as Potentially Exculpatory or Otherwise Material to the Defence's Preparation for the
Confirmation Hearing, para. 49 (June 20, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc514860.pdf ("After
more than a hundred years of struggle, a permanent international criminal court has finally emerged as a
unique symbol of the fight against impunity for the most heinous crimes of international concern."); see
also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Preamble, July 17, 1998 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter ICC Statute] ("Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by
taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation." (emphasis omitted)).
2. Jens David Ohlin, Meta-Theory of International Criminal Procedure: Vindicating the Rules of Law,
14 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 77,80-81 (2009).
3. Rep. of the Int'l Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Serious Violations of
Int'l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Terr. of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, paras. 26-30, U.N.
Doc. A/65/205-S/2010/413 (July 31, 2010). See also Rep. of the Int'l Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of Int'l Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Terr. of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations
Committed in the Terr. of Neighboring States Between 1 Jan. and 31 Dec. 1994, paras. 15-19, U.N. Doc
A/65/188-S/2010/408 (July 30, 2010) (showing the composition of the Chambers to include jurists from no
fewer than twenty-two different nations).
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crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity often implicate the policies of
governments and rebel groups.4
Despite the proliferation of international criminal tribunals and the widespread
recognition that international criminal trials are different, there has been relatively
little analysis of whether the legal actors that comprise these tribunals should be
subject to distinctive ethical rules.! Existing ethical codes for defense counsel at the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR") mirror domestic codes,' and
codes for prosecutors are brief and abstract.! The International Criminal Court
("ICC" or "Court") has adopted basic ethics codes for judges and defense counsel
but has yet to promulgate any formal set of ethical rules for ICC prosecutors.
This Article will analyze how the absence of an ethics code for the ICC
Prosecutor has impacted the Court's early cases. As this Article will demonstrate,
the Prosecutor has conflicting duties under the ICC Statute, and the Prosecutor's
decisions as to how to fulfill his statutory obligations have caused "ugly and
unhealthy" tensions' with the Court's Chambers"o and have brought controversy to
the Court. This Article hopes to begin a dialogue concerning the importance of a
code of conduct for the Office of the Prosecutor ("OTP") and suggests specific rules
that can help mitigate conflicts such as those that already have arisen in the Court's
early cases.
4. See Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial
Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 510, 510 (2003) (explaining that the ICC
has jurisdiction over "crimes of the utmost seriousness often committed by governments themselves, or
with their tacit approval" and describing the cases adjudicated by the ICC as "infused with political
implications").
5. Notable exceptions are: Judith A. McMorrow, Creating Norms of Attorney Conduct in
International Tribunals: A Case Study of the ICTY, 30 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 139 (2007); Jenia
loncheva Turner, Legal Ethics in International Criminal Defense, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 685 (2010)
[hereinafter Turner, Legal Ethics].
6. Compare U.N. Int'l Crim. Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Code of Professional Conduct for
Counsel Appearing Before the International Tribunal, IT/125 REV. 3, art. 11 (Aug 6, 2009),
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Defence/defence-codeof-conduct-july2009_en.pdf, and
U.N. Int'l Crim. Tribunal for Rwanda, Code of Professional Conduct for Defense Counsel, art. 6 (Mar.
14, 2008), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/English/Legal/Defence%20Counsel/English/04-Code%200f% 2 0
Conduct%20for%2ODefence%20Counsel.pdf, with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2006).
7. The ethics codes for ICTR and ICTY Prosecutors are each four pages. See U.N. Int'l Crim.
Tribunal for Rwanda, Standards of Professional Conduct for Prosecution Counsel, Prosecutor's
Regulation No. 2 (1999), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/O/English/Legal/Prosecutor/reg_05.pdf; U.N. Int'l
Crim. Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Standards of Professional Conduct for Prosecution Counsel,
Reg. No. 2 (Sept. 14, 1999), http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Miscellaneous/otp-regulation-
990914.pdf [hereinafter ICTY Standards]; see also infra Part I(C).
8. See THE SECRETARIATS OF THE INT'L Ass'N OF PROSECUTORS AND THE COAL. FOR THE INT'L
CRIM. CT., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR THE PROSECUTORS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.amicc.org/docs/prosecutor.pdf [hereinafter Draft OTP Code] (showing that
only a draft code released in 2002 for peer review exists); Int'l Crim. Ct. Office of the Prosecutor, Draft
Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, Book 2 (2005), http://www.jura.uni-muenchen.de/
fakultaet/lehrstuehle/satzger/materialien/istghdrre.pdf (setting out regulations intended to complement the
ICC Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence).
9. Marlise Simons, For International Criminal Court, Frustration and Missteps in First Trial, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 22, 2010, at A12 (quoting William Schabas).
10. The Court has three Chambers: a Pre-Trial Chamber, a Trial Chamber, and an Appeals
Chamber. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 39.
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Given the diversity of legal backgrounds in the OTP and the Court as a whole, it
will be difficult to gather consensus as to what a code of conduct should look like and
perhaps even what subjects should be addressed therein. Nevertheless, the
enterprise of generating an OTP code of conduct is worthwhile and should be
undertaken to provide some prospective guidance to prosecutors as to how to
address ethical dilemmas that are likely to arise during international criminal trials.
In Part I, I address the structure of the OTP and the current framework for
addressing misconduct by ICC prosecutors. I argue that notwithstanding the
existence of certain basic staff rules that are applicable to all ICC staff with fixed-
term appointments," there is an urgent need for a code of conduct. This is because
OTP lawyers come from diverse legal backgrounds and do not have a shared sense of
how to resolve ethical issues, and because the goals of international criminal justice
require that OTP attorneys be perceived as ethical. In Part II, I address conflicting
duties that have already arisen in the trial of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ("Lubanga").
These conflicts are (1) the Prosecutor's duty to investigate versus his duty to disclose
evidence and (2) his duty to act independently from Chambers versus his duty to
obey orders therefrom. Although the Appeals Chamber has issued rulings on these
issues, these rulings have not resolved how the Prosecutor should manage his
conflicting duties in future cases. I propose specific conduct rules that will make
serious disputes concerning disclosure and compliance with Chambers less likely to
occur.
In Part III, I focus on the Prosecutor's duty to act impartially versus his duty to
secure cooperation from the international community in connection with the
investigation and prosecution of ICC defendants. The OTP should not be precluded
from speaking publicly about ICC defendants because the OTP must secure the
cooperation of the public so that it can carry out its mandate to conduct
investigations, prosecute crimes, and secure the presence of defendants before the
Court. However, any statements made by the OTP should not be misleading or
prejudicial to the defendant. Under the current ICC framework, the OTP's public
statements are essentially unregulated.
It is tempting to dismiss some of the OTP's early difficulties as growing pains or
even incompetence on the part of the current Prosecutor. However, as this Article
will illustrate, the Prosecutor's duties under the ICC Statute are often conflicting or
unclear. Without a shared and detailed ethical framework for navigating these
conflicts, the OTP could often find itself acting in ways that may be
counterproductive to the ICC as a whole.
I. THE OTP AND THE IMPORTANCE OF LEGAL ETHICS
A. The OTP and Its Current Disciplinary Framework
The OTP is one of the four organs of the ICC along with Chambers, Registry,
and Presidency. 2 Under the ICC Statute, the OTP is responsible for "receiving
11. Staff Rules of the International Criminal Court, Scope and Purpose, ICC-ASP/4/3 (Aug. 25,
2005), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/56F9B14B-B682-4D9C-8762-A25B944FA214/140109/ICCASP
43 English.pdf [hereinafter Staff Rules].
12. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 34.
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referrals and any substantiated information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court, for examining them and for conducting investigations and prosecutions before
the Court."" The OTP is required to "act independently as a separate organ of the
Court."1 4 The OTP is led by the Prosecutor, who is elected by an absolute majority
of the members of the Assembly of States Parties ("ASP")." Luis Moreno-Ocampo
of Argentina has been the Prosecutor since the ICC began its day-to-day operations
in June of 2003."
The ICC Statute considers the Prosecutor's ethical obligations only in general
terms and as a part of his general qualifications. Article 42 states that the Prosecutor
must be a person of "high moral character" and be "highly competent in and have
extensive practical experience in the prosecution or trial of criminal cases."" The
Statute also forbids the Prosecutor from "engag[ing] in any activity which is likely to
interfere with his or her prosecutorial functions or to affect confidence in his or her
independence"" and "participat[ing] in any matter in which [his or her] impartiality
might reasonably be doubted on any ground.""
The ICC currently has no specific code of conduct for OTP prosecutors. The
International Association of Prosecutors and the Coalition for the International
Criminal Court proposed a draft code of conduct for prosecutors ("Draft OTP
Code") in 2002,20 but it has not been adopted.2' The ICC has adopted a Code of
Professional Conduct for Counsel ("Code for Counsel"), but it applies only to
"defence counsel, counsel acting for States, amici curiae and counsel or legal
representatives for victims and witnesses." 22 The ICC also has a Code of Judicial
Ethics.2 3 Other criminal tribunals have formulated codes of conduct specifically for
prosecutors.2 4
Although the ICC lacks a code of conduct for prosecutors, OTP attorneys,
including the Prosecutor himself, may be subject to dismissal or sanction if they
13. Id. art. 42(1).
14. Id.
15. Id. art. 42(2), (4). See also id. art. 112 (the ASP is composed of one member from each of the
State Parties to the Court).
16. The Prosecutor, INT'L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/
Office+of+the+Prosecutor/Biographies/The+Prosecutor.htm (last visited June 17, 2011). Prosecutor
Moreno-Ocampo's term expires in June 2012. See Press Release, Int'l Crim. Ct., Search Committee for
ICC Prosecutor Takes Up Work, ICC-ASP-20110207-PR626 (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/
menus/asp/press%20releases/press%20releases%202011/search%20committee%20for%20the%20positio
n%20of%20icc%20prosecutor%20takes%20up%20work?lan=en-GB.
17. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 42(3).
18. Id. art. 42(5).
19. Id. art. 42(7).
20. Draft OTP Code, supra note 8.
21. See ICC Activities, Codes of Conduct, AMERICAN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
COAL. FOR THE INT'L CRIM. CT., http://www.amicc.org/icc-activities.html (scroll down to "Codes of
Conduct") (last visited July 17, 2011) (discussing the hope that a draft could be presented for
consideration for adoption by the ICC).
22. Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel Appearing Before the International Criminal Court,
Res. ICC-ASP/4/Res.1, art. 1 (Dec. 2, 2005), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/BD397ECF-8CA8-44EF-
92C6-AB4BEBD55BE2/140121/ICCASP432ReslEnglish.pdf [hereinafter Code for Counsel].
23. Code of Judicial Ethics, Res. ICC-BD/02-01-05 (Mar. 9, 2005), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/
rdonlyres/A62EBCOF-D534-438F-A128-D3AC4CFDD644/140141/ICCBD20105_En.pdf.
24. For a discussion of the ICTY's adoption of standards for prosecutors, see infra Part I(C).
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violate the Staff Rules of the ICC ("Staff Rules").25 One of the Prosecutor's
responsibilities is to determine whether OTP staff members have violated the Staff
Rules and what disciplinary measures should be imposed.26 He is advised in this
capacity by the Disciplinary Advisory Board, which can take evidence and make
recommendations.27
The Staff Rules include provisions concerning independence,28 confidentiality,29
and conflicts of interest.30 These rules are general in scope. For example, Staff Rule
101.6, which concerns conflicts of interest, merely states that "[s]taff members shall
abstain from any conduct which may be directly or indirectly in conflict with the
discharge of their official duties."" Similarly, Staff Rule 101.3(i) states:
[S]taff members shall ensure that [their personal] views and
convictions do not adversely affect their official duties or the interest
of the Court. They shall conduct themselves at all times in a manner
befitting their status as international civil servants and shall not
engage in any activity that is incompatible with the proper discharge
of their duties with the Court. They shall avoid any action, in
particular any kind of public pronouncement, that may adversely
reflect on their status or on the integrity, independence and
impartiality that are required by that status.32
The Staff Rules are not directed specifically at OTP attorneys3 and would also
appear to be difficult to enforce against OTP attorneys without a normative
framework against which conduct can be judged. For example, without clearly
articulated standards of what level of "integrity, independence and impartiality" is
required of OTP attorneys, it will be difficult to adjudicate whether a particular
"public pronouncement" could adversely impact a prosecutor's "integrity" or
"status" under the Staff Rules.
In addition, although the Staff Rules nominally apply to all staff holding fixed-
term appointments,34 it is questionable whether they will actually be applied against
the Prosecutor or Deputy Prosecutor. The Prosecutor can be disciplined by the
Bureau of the Assembly of States Parties ("Bureau of the ASP") with reprimands or
fines.3' The Prosecutor is authorized to reprimand the Deputy Prosecutor; any fine
25. Staff Rules, supra note 11, R. 110.6.
26. Id. R. 110.6, 110.7.
27. The Disciplinary Advisory Board consists of three members, one appointed by the Registrar, one
appointed by the Prosecutor, and one elected by the staff representative body. Id. R. 110.3(a), 110.4(b),
(d)-(e).
28. Id. R. 101.3(a)-(b).
29. Id. R. 101.4.
30. Id. R. 101.6.
31. Staff Rules, supra note 11, R. 101.6(a).
32. Id. R. 101.3(i).
33. See id. Scope and Purpose ("These Staff Rules apply to staff members of the Court holding a
fixed-term appointment." (emphasis added)).
34. Id.
35. International Criminal Court Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICC-ASP/1/3, R. 30(2), 32 (Sept.
9, 2002), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/FlEOAC1C-A3F3-4A3C-B9A7-B3E8B115E886/140164/
Rules-of-procedure andEvidence.English.pdf [hereinafter ICC Rules]. "The Bureau of the Assembly
consists of a President, two Vice-Presidents and 18 members elected by the Assembly for three-year
terms." Bureau of the Assembly, INT'L CRIM. Cr., http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/Bureau (last visited
Oct. 29, 2011).
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must be recommended by the Prosecutor and approved by an absolute majority of
the Bureau of the ASP." Only an absolute majority of the ASP has the power to
remove the Prosecutor from office." The same applies to the Deputy Prosecutor,
with the additional requirement that the Prosecutor must have recommended
removal. To be removed, the Prosecutor or Deputy Prosecutor must have
"committed serious misconduct or a serious breach of his or her duties under the
Statute ... or [be] unable to exercise the functions required by this Statute."39 The
ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence ("ICC Rules") define "serious misconduct" as
conduct that is "incompatible with official functions, and causes or is likely to cause
serious harm to the proper administration of justice before the Court or the proper
internal functioning of the Court."40 The Prosecutor or Deputy Prosecutor commits a
"serious breach of duty" when he or she "has been grossly negligent in the
performance of his or her duties or has knowingly acted in contravention of those
duties."41
The ICC Rules lists several illustrative examples of "serious misconduct" and
"serious breach of duty."4 2 The ICC Statute and ICC Rules do not specifically define
a violation of the Staff Rules as "serious misconduct"' or "a serious breach of duty,"
which tends to suggest that a violation of the Staff Rules alone will not necessarily
serve as a basis for the ASP to remove either the Prosecutor or Deputy Prosecutor.
The Bureau of the ASP also could impose a reprimand or fine for a violation of the
Staff Rules if it determines that the violation constitutes misconduct of "a less serious
nature. But this assumes that the ASP and Bureau of the ASP are familiar with
the Staff Rules and are actively monitoring the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutor's
compliance therewith.
Beyond the Staff Rules and general prohibitions against misconduct and breach
of duty, OTP attorneys currently operate under no formal ethical constraints in
carrying out their day-to-day duties at the Court. As explored in the next section,
this is problematic because OTP prosecutors likely will have very different intuitions
as to how to fulfill their duties under the ICC Statute.
B. Why Is a Code of Conduct Needed?
Given the existence of disciplinary mechanisms that allow for the removal of
OTP attorneys and even the Prosecutor himself, it is perhaps understandable that the
36. ICC Rules, supra note 35, R. 30(3).
37. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 46(2)(b).
38. Id. art. 46(2)(c). The Prosecutor has the authority to reprimand the Deputy Prosecutor, but any
fine imposed must be approved by an absolute majority of the Bureau of the Assembly of States Parties.
ICC Rules, supra note 35, R. 30(3).
39. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 46(1)(a)-(b).
40. ICC Rules, supra note 35, R. 24(1)(a).
41. Id. R. 24(2).
42. Id. R. 24(1)-(2).
43. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 47; ICC Rules, supra note 35, R. 30, 32.
44. Professor Danner has suggested that the ASP is likely to be divided because of internal policy
disputes and that similar bodies have been unable to provide strong oversight over other international
legal organizations. See Danner, supra note 4, at 524 (explaining that the ASP will not be a sufficient
mechanism of accountability and "likely will have little impact on a prosecutor who is simply ineffective or
demonstrates poor judgment").
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OTP has not prioritized formulating a code of conduct. However, disciplinary
mechanisms are not a substitute for a fully conceived code of conduct that would
govern the day-to-day practice of OTP lawyers. The importance of ethical rules is
that they reflect lawyers' respect for the rule of law and consequently can help
legitimate their actions. As Professors Hazard and Dondi have suggested, "[I]f the
rule of law requires lawyers, lawyers also require rules for their governance. . . . [T]he
rules of professional ethics constitute the normative regime to which ... lawyers look
to in assessing the character of a lawyer's participation in the rule of law."4
Currently observers cannot assess whether OTP attorneys are acting appropriately
because of the minimal guidance provided by the ICC Statute concerning the
Prosecutor's ethical obligations. An OTP code of conduct would also give other
organs of the Court, particularly Chambers, a better sense of how the OTP interprets
its obligations.
ICC prosecutors likely require ethical rules more than domestic prosecutors do.
The OTP, like the Court as a whole, is composed of individuals from widely
divergent backgrounds in terms of nationality and legal culture.46 There are some
obvious advantages to this. The representativeness of the OTP tends to at least
somewhat undercut claims that the OTP acts predominately in the interests of
powerful nations.47 OTP attorneys also may be less prone to "groupthink," because
they are likely to approach legal problems from different perspectives and legal
backgrounds.48
Nevertheless, because the ICC system is sui generis, one would expect that the
OTP would struggle with how to balance its various obligations under the ICC
Statute.49  The OTP cannot draw on a shared legal culture to resolve good faith
disputes as to how the Prosecutor should act in a given situation.io Domestic ethical
codes vary, and there may be disagreements within the OTP as to whether an ethical
problem even exists, with some potentially taking the view that the only relevant
question is one of litigation strategy." A code of conduct specific to the OTP would
45. GEOFFREY HAZARD & ANGELO DONDI, LEGAL ETHICS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 2 (2004).
46. The ICC Statute requires, for example, that the Prosecutor and the Deputy Prosecutor be of
different nationalities. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 42(2).
47. The ICC often has been criticized for serving the interests of European countries and acting as a
"[clourt for Africa." Gabriella Blum, On a Differential Law of War, 52 HARV. INT'L L.J. 163, 175 (2011)
(quoting HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COURTING HISTORY: THE LANDMARK INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT'S FIRST YEAR 44-45 (July 2008), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/
reports/iccO7O8webwcover.pdf). See also Lars Waldorf, A Mere Pretense of Justice: Complementarity,
Sham Trials, and Victor's Justice at the Rwanda Tribunal, 33 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1221, 1275 (2010)
(noting that the post-Nuremberg justification of international criminal tribunals rests "on claims that they
are more impartial (i.e., more cosmopolitan) than national tribunals and domestic criminal law").
48. For a seminal discussion of lawyers and group dynamics, see Donald Langevoort, Where Were the
Lawyers?, 46 VAND. L. REV. 76, 105-08 (1993).
49. Professor Byrne has made a similar argument with respect to "the basic choreography of
international trial practice." Rosemary Byrne, The New Public International Lawyer and the Hidden Art
of International Trial Practice, 25 CONN. J. INT'L L. 243, 248 (2010) ("For practitioners, national codes of
procedure and evidence reflect, rather than create, deeply rooted conceptions of process.... In the
international context ... rules of procedure and evidence have the daunting task of creating, rather than
reflecting, a shared and coherent conception of process and professional roles.").
50. See id. at 252-53 (noting that "[in the international trial, players with divergent training and
origins rotate, as do the varied expectations about process, justice, and the respective roles of legal
actors").
51. As discussed infra Part II(B), an example of this phenomenon is the possible tension between the
Prosecutor's duty to obey orders from Chambers and the risk that following those orders will cause him to
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provide a common framework for conceptualizing the Prosecutor's obligations under
the ICC Statute. In the absence of such a framework, individual OTP attorneys may
either follow their domestic codes of conduct (to the extent their home nations have
codes of conduct) or merely follow their individual sense of what is ethical.
Alternatively, OTP attorneys may simply defer to the instructions of the Prosecutor
and Deputy Prosecutor inasmuch as they cannot express any ethical concerns that
they may have in terms of a shared OTP code of conduct.
Another reason that a code of conduct would be particularly valuable for the
OTP is the natural tendency of prosecutors to sympathize with victims of crimes at
the expense of ICC defendants. To be sure, this is a familiar phenomenon in many
domestic systems as well.52 However, as Professor Turner has suggested, the
phenomenon may be more pronounced in international criminal trials because the
"exceptional severity and magnitude of international crimes tends to magnify the
desire to protect victims' interests."" What is more, many actors who tend to
advocate for protecting defendants' rights against government abuses at the domestic
level are among the most vocal advocates for prosecuting defendants at the
international level." Even if states and non-governmental organizations may have
the ability to act as a check on prosecutorial overreach,5 they may choose not to act
when the Prosecutor's actions are predominately harming the interests of defendants.
In addition, the OTP's investigative activities-largely occurring in war-torn
regions-occur with minimal oversight from the Court's other organs," and
defendants' interests may not be adequately safeguarded during these
investigations."
Lastly, international criminal law is not only concerned with prosecuting the
guilty but also with contributing to reconciliation at the national level by creating a
historical record and educating those who have been affected by crimes of war,"
violate one of his duties under the ICC Statute, thus risking sanction.
52. Turner, Legal Ethics, supra note 5, at 696.
53. Id.
54. Id. See also Darryl Robinson, The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law, 21 LEIDEN J.
INT'L L. 925, 930 (2008) ("Many traditionally liberal actors (such as non-governmental organizations or
academics), who in a national system would vigilantly protect defendants and potential defendants, are
among the most strident pro-prosecution voices .... ").
55. See Danner, supra note 4, at 525 (noting that "the ICC Prosecutor will be accountable to a variety
of entities, including states that are not party to the treaty, and other actors such as NGOs").
56. See Michele Caianiello, Law of Evidence at the International Criminal Court: Blending
Accusatorial and Inquisitorial Models, 36 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 287, 313 (2011) ("[Olnly the
prosecutor knows the entirety of the evidence gathered by his office before trial. Judges cannot search in
the prosecutors' files to gather more information relevant to a case.").
57. See id. at 295-97 (noting that the OTP has several structural advantages over defense counsel
during the investigation phase of ICC trials); see also Elena Baylis, Outsourcing Investigations, 14 UCLA J.
INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 121, 145 (2009) ("NGOs and other third parties are rarely directing their efforts
at producing compelling exculpatory evidence for international criminal defendants . . . ").
58. See Turner, Legal Ethics, supra note 5, at 696-97 (summarizing that the goals of "compiling an
accurate historical record, spreading a message of respect for human rights, promoting peace and
reconciliation, and giving voice to victims" have helped shape international criminal proceedings). Such
goals generally fall under the rubric of transitional justice. See Jean Galbraith, The Pace of International
Criminal Justice, 31 MICH. J. INT'L L. 79, 90-92 (2010) (describing transitional justice and explaining that
"[c]onsiderations of the past, such as recognition of the past atrocities, restitution for victims, and
retribution against certain wrongdoers, are important primarily as a means... of achieving a peaceful
future").
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because situations of mass violence are often accompanied by "mass denial."59
Scholars also have claimed that international criminal trials have the potential to
demonstrate to post-conflict societies how to fairly and impartially adjudicate even
horrific crimesi6 These transitional justice goals are important for the ICC in
particular because it is concerned only with "the most serious crimes of concern to
the international community as a whole"" and therefore anticipates that the vast
majority of war crimes will be adjudicated in the nations where they occurred. 62 To
the extent that the Prosecutor acts in ways that are perceived as unethical-
regardless of whether or not his acts can be justified under the ICC Statute-the
educative and demonstrative purposes of ICC trials are undermined.63
Given the amount of time taken to reach a consensus as to the ICC Statute, the
process of formulating and adopting -an agreed-upon code of conduct for the OTP
may also be controversial and time-consuming.' Nevertheless, the ICC has been
able to adopt codes of conduct for defense counsel and other non-OTP attorneys
who appear before the Court, as well as the Court's judges.65 Although one can
question whether these codes of conduct provide sufficient guidance, ICC
prosecutors are the Court's only legal actors that are currently not subject to a
discrete set of ethical rules.
In the next section, I explain why the code of conduct should be designed
specifically with OTP prosecutors in mind and should not necessarily match the
codes of conduct that have been formulated by other international criminal tribunals.
C. A Detailed Code of Conduct for ICC Prosecutors
Unlike the ICC, other international criminal tribunals have formulated and
adopted codes of conduct for prosecutors.M In adopting its own Standards of
Professional Conduct ("ICTY Standards") in 1999, the Prosecutor's Office of the
59. Galbraith, supra note 58, at 88.
60. See Jane Stromseth, Pursuing Accountability for Atrocities After Conflict: What Impact on
Building the Rule of Law?, 38 GEO. J. INT'L L. 251, 262 (2007) ("Accountability proceedings can
contribute to strengthening the rule of law in post-conflict societies through their demonstration effects.");
see also Marieke Wierda, Comparison of the Legacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the ICC
Intervention in Uganda From a Practical Perspective, 103 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 218, 220-21 (2009)
(noting the positive effects that the ICC's involvement in Uganda has had on the domestic legal system).
61. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 5(1).
62. See Philippe Kirsch, The Role of the International Criminal Court in Enforcing International
Criminal Law, 22 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 539, 543-44 (2007) (discussing the ICC's role as a "court of last
resort").
63. See ICTY Standards, supra note 7, art. 1 ("[Plrosecutors ... represent the international
community .. . and standards and rules concerning the performance of their important responsibilities
should promote principles of fairness and professionalism.").
64. See Philippe Kirsch, Preface to the First Edition of COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT at xxxvii (Otto Triffterer ed., 2008) (noting that negotiations to
establish the ICC began in 1988 and that the ICC Statute was adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic
Conference ten years later).
65. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
66. ICTY Standards, supra note 7; Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel with the Right of
Audience before the Special Court for Sierra Leone (May 14, 2005), http://www.sc-sl.org/Link
Click.aspx?fileticket=IbTonPmXLHk%3d&tabid=176; Int'l Crim. Tribunal for Rwanda, Prosecutor's
Regulations no. 2 (Oct. 21, 1999), Standards of Professional Conduct: Prosecution Counsel,
http://unictr.org/Portals/0/EnglishlLegal/Prosecutor/reg_05.pdf.
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International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") noted the
existence of codes of conduct for defense counsel and found that "it is desirable that
the standards of professional conduct of prosecution counsel should also be clearly
set out and understood." 67 The Prosecutor's Office also specifically established that
the ICTY Standards would prevail over inconsistent domestic codes of conduct."
Although the ICC can certainly look to the codes of conduct of other
international criminal tribunals, it would be imprudent for the OTP to simply import
their standards.6 ' The ICC's structure is different from that of ad hoc international
criminal tribunals such as the ICTY in important ways. For example, the ICTY has a
limited mandate to only adjudicate crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and
has been criticized for being unconcerned with outreach and the instilling of the rule
of law in the former Yugoslavia." Conversely the ICC is a permanent court" that is
intended to foster "lasting respect for ... the enforcement of international justice" 72
and specifically contemplates that the vast majority of war crimes will be prosecuted
domestically."
The ICC Prosecutor's role is also unique. The Prosecutor is required, "[l~n
order to establish the truth, . . . [to] investigate incriminating and exonerating
circumstances equally."7 4 The ICTY Prosecutor has no such obligation under the
ICTY Statute." More broadly, ICTY prosecutors have been criticized for excessive
adversarialism that "gives rise to bitter and sometimes imbalanced contests between
the prosecutor and defence counsel that may end up occluding the truth," 6 whereas
the role of the ICC prosecutor is more in accordance with the civil law tradition,
which sets as a prosecutor's ultimate goal the establishment of truth."
67. ICTY Standards, supra note 7, art. 1.
68. Id. art. 3.
69. This raises the issue of whether the movement of attorneys between the various criminal tribunals
may be problematic from the perspective of legal ethics. These attorneys may bring with them useful
investigative skills and practical experience but may also inadvertently bring ethical views and practices
that do not comport with the ICC's ideals.
70. See Mirko Klarin, The Impact of the ICTY Trials on Public Opinion in the Former Yugoslavia, 7 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 89, 95-96 (2009) (criticizing the ICTY's outreach and noting that the ICTY has not
improved the legal systems of the former Yugoslavia); David Tolbert, The International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia: Unforeseen Successes and Foreseeable Shortcomings, 26 FLETCHER F. OF WORLD
AFF. 7, 13 (Summer/Fall 2002) (noting that the ICTY's work was subject to "gross distortions" in the
former Yugoslavia because of its lack of emphasis on educating the people of the region).
71. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 1.
72. Id. Preamble.
73. See supra note 62.
74. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 54(1)(a).
75. See COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1080
n.14 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2008) [hereinafter Triffterer] (noting that this requirement is not present in the
ICTY Statute).
76. Jerome de Hemptinne, The Creation of Investigating Chambers at the International Criminal
Court: An Option Worth Pursuing?, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 402, 404 (2007). See also id. at 408 ("[R]ather
than trying to depict the truth as precisely as possible, the [ICTY] prosecutor often seeks above all to win
his case, and therefore presents it in a manner that may sometimes seem partial, in both senses of the
term.").
77. Triffterer, supra note 75, at 1078. See also ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 54(1)(a) (identifying the
Prosecutor's broad objective as establishing the truth).
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Of course, even if the ICC were to adopt a code of conduct that recognizes the
unique duties and responsibilities of the ICC Prosecutor, the code of conduct could
not eliminate the possibility of good faith disagreements within the OTP as to how to
proceed in a given situation. Indeed, because of the differences in legal backgrounds
among OTP attorneys, different attorneys may interpret provisions of the code of
conduct differently. Nevertheless, if the ICC were to formulate a comprehensive
code of conduct, it would serve as a common starting point for ethical deliberation
and, if sufficiently specific, would lower the likelihood of major ethical disagreements
within the OTP.
The ICTY's standards for prosecutors consist of four pages and contain vague
and abstract language." The ICC may wish to consider providing detailed guidance
to ICC prosecutors as to how to conceive of their conflicting duties under the ICC
Statute in order to ensure that there is some continuity in the practices of the OTP
over time. While the Prosecutor should be afforded some latitude to shape the
ethics of the OTP, the other organs of the Court would benefit from a clearer sense
of which actions are permissible for OTP prosecutors to take and which are not.
Indeed, as described in the next sections, if the Prosecutor is afforded too much
discretion in determining how to prioritize his duties under the ICC Statute, he may
act in ways that, while arguably consistent with the ICC Statute, do not fully take into
account the interests of the ICC as a whole. This is illustrated by the Prosecutor's
attempts to resolve his conflicting duties to (1) investigate versus disclose evidence;
(2) act independently from Chambers versus obey orders therefrom; and (3) bring
defendants to justice versus act impartially. The first two conflicts arose in the
Lubanga trial while the last arose in connection with the Prosecutor's securing of an
arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir.
II. CONFLICTING DUTIES AND THE LUBANGA TRIAL
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is a national of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
("DRC") and the alleged founder and commander-in-chief of the Union des Patriotes
Congolais ("UPC") and the Forces Patriotiques pour la Libgration du Congo
("FPLC")." The Prosecutor charged Mr. Lubanga with war crimes under Articles
8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii) of the ICC Statute for the enlistment and conscription
of children into the UPC and FPLC in connection with the Ituri conflict in the
DRC.81 Mr. Lubanga first appeared before the ICC on March 20, 2006, but his actual
trial did not begin until January 26, 2009.'
The Trial Chamber was forced to repeatedly delay the start of the Lubanga trial
because of the Prosecutor's decision to not disclose potentially exculpatory
78. See, e.g., ICTY Standards, supra note 7, R. 2(b) (stating that prosecution counsel are expected to
"maintain the honour and dignity of the profession and conduct themselves accordingly with proper
decorum").
79. In this regard, it is noteworthy how detailed the ICC's other texts are. The ICC Statute has 128
articles and there are 225 rules of evidence and procedure. See generally ICC Statute, supra note 1; ICC
Rules, supra note 35.
80. Lubanga Case, COAL. FOR THE INT'L CRIM. Cr., http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/?
mod=drctimelinelubanga (last visited Oct. 8, 2011); Thomas Lubanga, THE HAGUE JUSTICE PORTAL,
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/eCache/DEF/8/156.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2011).
81. Lubanga Case, supra note 80; Thomas Lubanga, supra note 80.
82. Lubanga Case, supra note 80.
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documents.8 ' The Chamber also stayed the trial after the Prosecutor failed to comply
with an order that he disclose the identity of an intermediary who had contacted
witnesses on the Prosecutor's behalf.
A. The Delay of the Lubanga Trial and the Duties of Investigation and Disclosure
1. The Stay of Proceedings
The Trial Chamber was forced to stay the Lubanga trial in June 2008 because of
the Prosecutor's non-disclosure of potentially exculpatory documents to the
defense." The Prosecutor had obtained the documents from third parties, including
the United Nations,8 pursuant to Article 54(3)(e) of the ICC Statute, which provides:
The Prosecutor may agree not to disclose, at any stage of the
proceedings, documents or information that the Prosecutor obtains
on the condition of confidentiality and solely for the purpose of
generating new evidence, unless the provider of the information
consents .
As a result of the confidentiality agreements, the Prosecutor was unable to
disclose more than 200 documents that contained potentially exculpatory
information,' including "evidence indicating that [Lubanga] suffered from a mental
condition;" information that he may have acted under duress, compulsion, or in self-
defense; and information that he "had insufficient command over people who
committed the crimes with which he [was] charged."89
In deciding to stay Mr. Lubanga's trial, the Trial Chamber held that (i) the
disclosure of exculpatory evidence is a fundamental aspect of a defendant's right to a
fair trial; (ii) the Prosecutor had incorrectly used Article 54(3)(e) such that a
significant body of exculpatory materials that would otherwise have been disclosed
was withheld; and (iii) the Trial Chamber was prevented from determining whether
the Prosecutor had violated Mr. Lubanga's right to a fair trial because the Trial
Chamber had been unable to inspect the materials on account of the confidentiality
agreements."o The Trial Chamber concluded that under these circumstances "the
trial process [had] been ruptured to such a degree that it is now impossible to piece
together the constituent elements of a fair trial"91 and ordered Mr. Lubanga's
release.92 The Trial Chamber did, however, give leave to the Prosecutor to appeal its
judgment and stayed its order to release Mr. Lubanga pending the appeal.9 3
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1486, Judgment on Appeal of Disclosure
Decision, para. 6 (Oct. 21, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc578371.pdf.
86. Id. para. 21.
87. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 42(3).
88. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Judgment on Appeal of Disclosure Decision, supra note 85, para. 21.
89. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1401, Decision on Non-Disclosure, para. 22
(June 13, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc511249.pdf.
90. Id. paras. 92, 94.
91. Id. para. 93.
92. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1418, Decision on the Release of Thomas
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The Appeals Chamber concurred with the Trial Chamber that Mr. Lubanga's
right to a fair trial would be violated if the Prosecutor could withhold potentially
exculpatory documents obtained pursuant to Article 54(3)(e).9 4  The Appeals
Chamber did not order the Prosecutor to disclose the exculpatory documents to the
defendant, however, but held that the Prosecutor should disclose the documents to
the Trial Chamber so that it could determine whether the documents would need to
be provided to the defense.95 If the Trial Chamber determined that disclosure was
required, the Prosecutor would have to seek the consent of the information providers
to disclose the documents." If the Prosecutor could not obtain the requisite consents,
the Chamber could decide what measures should be taken to preserve a fair trial
without the disclosure of the relevant documents." Since the Prosecutor had
disclosed some of the potentially exculpatory documents to the Trial Chamber while
the appeal was pending, and the information providers had indicated a newfound
willingness to allow some of the information contained in the documents to be shared
with the defense," the Appeals Chamber, over the objection of one judge, reversed
the order to release Mr. Lubanga." By November 2008, the Prosecutor was able to
disclose all of the potentially exculpatory documents to the defense, and the Trial
Chamber lifted its stay.oo
2. Confidentiality Agreements and the Duty to Investigate
Although the disclosure dispute did not end the Lubanga trial, the Prosecutor
clearly over-relied on confidentiality agreements to build his case against Mr.
Lubanga. By its express terms, Article 54(3)(e) is supposed to be used to obtain
information that can assist the Prosecutor in generating evidence; instead, the
Prosecutor used the provision to directly obtain evidence. 0 ' Fifty-five percent of the
materials that the Prosecutor obtained in the DRC investigation had been provided
under Article 54(3)(e), and 8,000 documents specific to the Lubanga trial were
subject to confidentiality agreements. 02  The OTP could not have reasonably
Lubanga Dyilo, para. 35 (July 2, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc522804.pdf.
93. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1417, Decision on Leave to Appeal, para. 32
(July 2, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc522803.pdf.
94. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Judgment on Appeal of Disclosure Decision, supra note 85, para. 95.
95. Id. para. 3.
96. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Judgment on Appeal of Disclosure Decision, supra note 85, para. 48. See
also ICC Rules, supra note 35, R. 82(1) ("Where material or information is in the possession or control of
the Prosecutor which is protected under Article 54, paragraph 3(e), the Prosecutor may not subsequently
introduce such material or information into evidence without the prior consent of the provider of the
material or information . . . .").
97. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Judgment on Appeal of Disclosure Decision, supra note 85, para. 48
98. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1487, Judgment on Appeal of Release
Decision, paras. 41, 44, 45 (Oct. 21, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc578365.pdf.
99. Id. para. 41.
100. Transcript of Status Conference at 3-4, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-98 (Nov. 18,
2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc586028.pdf; Rachel Katzman, The Non-Disclosure of
Confidential Exculpatory Evidence and the Lubanga Proceedings: How the ICC Defense System Affects
the Accused's Right to a Fair Trial, 8 Nw. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 77, 78 (2009).
101. See Kai Ambos, Confidential Investigations (Article 54(3)(e) ICC Statute) vs. Disclosure
Obligations: The Lubanga Case and National Law, 12 NEW CRIM. L. REv. 543, 554-56 (2009) (describing
the "irresolvable conflicts" generated when Article 54(3)(e) is used to gather direct evidence).
102. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Judgment on Appeal of Disclosure Decision, supra note 85, para. 32.
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expected that none of these documents would have to be disclosed to the defense.10 3
Indeed, the ICC Statute takes a broad view of the Prosecutor's duty to disclose
evidence:
[T]he Prosecutor shall ... disclose to the defence evidence in the
Prosecutor's possession or control which he or she believes shows or
tends to show the innocence of the accused, or to mitigate the guilt
of the accused, or which may affect the credibility of prosecution
evidence."
Moreover, the Prosecutor did not appear to take his disclosure obligations
sufficiently seriously."' The issue of the Prosecutor's failure to provide exculpatory
documents obtained on the condition of confidentiality to the defense first arose
before the Pre-Trial Chamber in September 2006,"6 and the Trial Chamber
suspended the start of the Lubanga trial to afford the Prosecutor additional time to
obtain the consent of the information providers to disclose the documents.'' The
Prosecutor received permission to disclose the documents to the defense only on the
eve of the Appeals Chamber judgment on the issue,os suggesting that the Prosecutor
may have been less concerned with Mr. Lubanga's right to receive exculpatory
information than with the prospect of his release.'" At a minimum, it appears that
the Prosecutor may not fully have sought to persuade information providers to waive
confidentiality until Mr. Lubanga's release was imminent.
However, it would be a mistake to dismiss the Prosecutor's decision to use
confidentiality agreements as mere prosecutorial overreach. The Prosecutor has
described the power to enter into confidentiality agreements with individuals and
organizations located in countries where he is investigating as "the core of the
Prosecution's ability to fulfill its mandate.""o The Appeals Chamber has agreed that
Article 54(3)(e) was an important investigative tool for the Prosecutor, particularly
with respect to investigations in countries such as the DRC that are dangerous for
103. See Heikelina Verrijn Stuart, The ICC in Trouble, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 409, 414 (2008) ("When
the OTP ... agrees to confidentiality in relation to virtually all provided materials, which are furthermore
not obtained for the sole use as [a] springboard to find new evidence, the core role of the judges to
guarantee a fair trial and to be the custodian of the custodians, has become moot."). Cf. MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 3.8 (2006) ("A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not
simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant
is accorded procedural justice.").
104. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 67(2). This duty becomes even greater if the Prosecutor intends
to use the materials at trial. See ICC Rules, supra note 35, R. 77 ("The Prosecutor shall . . . permit the
defence to inspect any books, documents, photographs and other tangible objects in the possession or
control of the Prosecutor, which are material to the preparation of the defence or are intended for use by
the Prosecutor as evidence for purposes of the confirmation hearing or at trial.").
105. Professor Ambos has suggested that the OTP simply did not give much thought to what
documents would have to be disclosed in its haste to collect information with respect to its investigation.
Ambos, supra note 101, at 551-52.
106. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Judgment on Appeal of Disclosure Decision, supra note 85, para. 86.
107. Id. para. 8 (Pikis, J., separate opinion).
108. Katzman, supra note 100, at 85.
109. See also id. at 97 ("It remains unclear ... why the OTP and the information providers took so
long to reach a viable solution.").
110. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Judgment on Appeal of Disclosure Decision, supra note 85, para. 25
(quoting a submission of the Prosecutor).
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the Prosecutor to enter.' In fact, the Prosecutor's investigation occurred during an
active armed conflict, necessitating reliance on third parties to suggest leads, identify
potential witnesses, and directly provide evidence in some cases.1 12 Commentators
have supported the Prosecutor's view of the central importance of his powers under
Article 54(3)(e)."'
Indeed, it is likely that the OTP will have to continue to rely on information
providers, many of whom may expect confidentiality, in future investigations"
because the OTP does not have the capacity or resources to conduct full, intensive
investigations with respect to every conflict before the Court."' Nor does it have its
own police force."' While prosecutors at the ad hoc tribunals have been able to
obtain access to crime scenes, the OTP cannot even enter certain countries that it is
investigating, such as Sudan."' For these reasons, the Prosecutor has no choice but to
rely on individuals and organizations that are familiar with the region to provide
information.
If the Prosecutor cannot provide assurances to information providers, they may
refuse to assist him due to safety concerns, which could imperil his ability to gather
evidence (whether it happens to be inculpatory or exculpatory to ICC defendants)."
In particular, the United Nations and human rights groups-such as those that had
provided much of the confidential information in the Lubanga case"'-may cease
acting as sources of information because they may be subject to reprisals if their
assistance to the ICC Prosecutor were to become public. For example, Mona
Rishmawi, the Legal Advisor for the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights, has warned that, "[g]iven the nature of the UN operations on the
ground, the nature of the crimes within the ICC jurisdiction, and the limited ability of
the ICC at this stage to carry out serious witness protection work, [disclosure of
111. Id. para. 42. See also BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEPT. OF
STATE, 2009 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS: DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (2010) (commenting on
the DRC's poor human rights record and serious abuses of security forces).
112. See Stuart, supra note 103, at 414 (describing the difficulties of collecting reliable evidence
during an armed conflict); Alex Whiting, Lead Evidence and Discovery Before the International Criminal
Court: The Lubanga Case, 14 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 207, 210 (2009) (same).
113. See, e.g., Triffterer, supra note 75, at 1086 ("Without ensuring the confidentiality of information,
confidence in the integrity of the Prosecutor's work would be quickly undermined and the ability of the
Prosecutor to prepare and prosecute cases would grind to a halt."); Whiting, supra note 112, at 227-30
(noting that without Article 54(3)(e), witnesses would be reluctant to provide evidence in the midst of
ongoing conflicts and the ICC has no direct access to evidence in certain countries).
114. See Whiting, supra note 112, at 231 (noting that disputes concerning disclosure and
confidentiality of information are likely to occur in future cases).
115. See Brian D. Lepard, How Should the ICC Prosecutor Exercise His or Her Discretion? The Role
of Fundamental Ethical Principles, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 553, 556 (2010) ("There is no question, of
course, that the Prosecutor, handicapped by limited resources and confronting a myriad of situations
throughout the globe that may involve crimes within the Court's jurisdiction, faces challenging dilemmas
. . . ."); see also Triffterer, supra note 75, at 1078 ("It is unlikely that the Prosecutor would be able to
perform [his] functions successfully without enlisting the assistance of Governments.").
116. Baylis, supra note 57, at 122 ("Lacking its own police force, the ICC depends on state
cooperation to conduct its investigations, enforce arrest warrants, and carry out other basic functions.").
117. Whiting, supra note 112, at 230.
118. See Ambos, supra note 101, at 567 (noting that sources of information would "dry up" without
Article 54(3)(e)).
119. Whiting, supra note 112, at 208.
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material obtained under Article 54(3)(e)] could seriously hamper the flow of
information."1 20
Although prosecutors in domestic settings are frequently faced with the
question of what should be disclosed to the defense-indeed, there is a constitutional
rule in the United States that specifies prosecutors' duties in this regard' 21-there
simply is not the corresponding need to rely on third parties to suggest leads and
identify witnesses. Domestic prosecutors can, along with law enforcement,
effectively investigate most crimes that occur within their jurisdiction and directly
collect evidence. The demands on the ICC Prosecutor are unique in this regard, and,
at least in some circumstances, he should be able to provide assurances of
confidentiality to individuals and organizations that assisted him with his
investigations.
3. Lingering Questions Concerning the Duties of Disclosure and
Investigation
That the Appeals Chamber eventually was called upon to determine whether
the Prosecutor fulfilled his disclosure obligations in the Lubanga case is unsurprising.
Prosecutors at the ICTY and ICTR also have been repeatedly accused of failing to
fulfill their disclosure obligations,122 and these tribunals have spent a great deal of
time and energy in resolving disclosure disputes.123
Beyond individual trials, however, there is also the danger that in failing to
fulfill their disclosure obligations, prosecutors may be advancing a distorted history,
jeopardizing what many believe to be an important aspiration of international
criminal law.124 For example, Professor Erlinder has accused the ICTR prosecutors
of ignoring Tutsi crimes (particularly those of Rwanda's current president, Paul
Kagame) so as to perpetuate the narrative that the Rwandan genocide was a "long-
120. Discussion, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 763, 772 (2008) (remarks of Mona Rishmawi, Legal Advisor,
Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights), quoted in Katzman, supra note 100, at 99. See
also Ambos, supra note 101, at 567 ("[I]f the identity of these informants is revealed-either directly or
indirectly by revealing the information they provided-they run a serious risk of being intimidated (or
worse).").
121. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that "the suppression by the prosecution
of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution").
122. See Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Defense Perspectives on Law & Politics in International Criminal
Trials, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 529, 557-58 (2008) [hereinafter Turner, Defense Perspectives] (quoting interviews
with defense counsel at the ICTY and ICTR that prosecutors are "disdainful" of their obligation to collect
exculpatory evidence and that disclosure of any such evidence often occurs too close to trial); see also
Charmaine de los Reyes, Revisiting Disclosure Obligations at the ICTR and its Implications for the Rights
of the Accused, 4 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 583, 584 (2005) ("If the ICTR wishes to disassociate itself from
misconceptions of its being a victor's court, one step it may take is to reconsider recent jurisprudence on
the topic of disclosure and its practical and substantive effect on the accused and the principle of
fairness.").
123. Salvatore Zappalk, The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Materials and the Recent
Amendment to Rule 68 ICTY RPE, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 620, 623 (2004); Claude Kress, The Procedural
Law of the International Criminal Court: Anatomy of a Unique Compromise, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 603,
610 (2003).
124. See supra note 58.
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planned conspiracy to kill Tutsi civilians" by the Hutu-dominated army.125 Whether
or not one believes Erlinder's charges, for more than fourteen years the ICTR failed
to produce thousands of pages of documents that were produced by the United
Nations and a variety of non-governmental organizations that were in Rwanda when
the genocide occurred.12 6 Some of these documents tended to call into question that
there was a longstanding Hutu plot to seize power after the assassination of President
Juvenal Habyarimana and massacre Tutsi civilians.27
In light of the history of problems with respect to disclosure in international
criminal trials, and the ICC's own experience with the Lubanga trial, the ICC may
wish to re-consider the approach of treating disclosure issues on a case-by-case basis,
as opposed to attempting to provide prospective guidance to prosecutors in regarding
how to conceive of their disclosure obligations. Specifically in terms of the
Prosecutor's conflicting duties of disclosure and investigation, an OTP code of
conduct should attempt to strike a balance. The Draft OTP Code, however, states
both that the Prosecutor "shall ... [p]rotect the confidentiality of all information and
evidence retained, stored, and secured through investigation by the Prosecutor, or
others representing the Prosecutor in the exercise of his or her functions,"'28 and that
the Prosecutor shall "ensure that evidence favourable to the accused is disclosed in
accordance with the Rules and the requirements of a fair trial."'29 Left unanswered is
which duty should take precedence.
The Appeals Chamber's decision clearly states that the duty to disclose must
take precedence,' and the Prosecutor did eventually disclose all of the documents
that he believed to be potentially exculpatory to Mr. Lubanga's defense."' However,
by the time of the Appeals Chamber's decision, a great deal of reputational harm had
already come to the Court. Scholars claimed that Mr. Lubanga could not be given a
fair trial because of the Prosecutor's over-reliance on evidence obtained on the
condition of confidentiality. 2 Observers in the DRC, particularly in the Ituri region
where Mr. Lubanga allegedly committed his crimes, questioned "the professionalism
and the ability of the ICC to carry out its mandate" given that the confidentiality
problem had arisen early on in the proceedings but nearly ended the trial on the eve
of its supposed commencement.13
Perhaps of greater significance is that, notwithstanding the Appeals Chamber's
decision, it is impossible to know whether Lubanga received all of the documents to
125. Peter Erlinder, The UN Security Council Ad Hoc Rwanda Tribunal: International Justice or
Juridically-Constructed "Victor's Impunity"?, 4 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 131, 148-51 (2010). Professor
Erlinder claims, for example, that when Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte attempted to investigate crimes
committed by Kagame that she was in effect fired. Id. at 161-63.
126. Id. at 148-49.
127. Id. at 167.
128. Draft OTP Code, supra note 8, art. 9(3).
129. Id. art. 12(1).
130. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Judgment on Appeal of Disclosure Decision, supra note 85, paras. 2, 44.
131. See supra note 100.
132. See, e.g., Stuart, supra note 103, at 414 ("When the OTP .. .agrees to confidentiality in relation
to virtually all provided materials, which are furthermore not obtained for the sole use as springboard to
find new evidence, the core role of the judges to guarantee a fair trial and to be the custodian of the
custodians, has become moot."); Ambos, supra note 101, at 567-68 ("disclosure of (exculpatory) evidence
goes to the heart of an accused's right to a fair trial").
133. See, e.g., DRC: ICC Suspension a Risk for Ituri Stability, IRIN AFRICA (June 24, 2008),
http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=78820 (quoting a human rights lawyer in Kinshasa).
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which he is entitled under the ICC Statute.'3 4 The Prosecutor may have taken a
narrow view of what evidence "tends to show the innocence of the accused, or to
mitigate the guilt of the accused, or which may affect the credibility of prosecution
evidence" under Article 67(2) because so many documents were obtained on the
condition of confidentiality." Indeed, of the thousands of documents obtained from
information providers on the condition of confidentiality, the Prosecutor determined
that only some 200 contained "potentially exculpatory information or information. . .
potentially material to the preparation of the defence.""'
Domestic prosecutors can be subject to disciplinary proceedings' and even
criminal prosecution when they suppress evidence 38 but there are no equivalent
mechanisms to ensure the compliance of ICC prosecutors with their disclosure
obligations.'3 9 In terms of the Lubanga trial, it was in the self-interest of the
Prosecutor to characterize his decision to over-rely on confidentiality agreements
with information providers as a relatively minor threat to the fair trial rights of Mr.
Lubanga. The possibility of a fair trial for Mr. Lubanga would have been far more
remote if the Prosecutor were to have admitted that he could not disclose a greater
number of exculpatory documents. By conceiving of his disclosure obligations
narrowly, the Prosecutor also would have been able to save himself the
embarrassment of having to inform information providers that he could not honor
his promise to preserve the confidentiality of a significant percentage of the materials
that they had provided.
Even if the Prosecutor does not over-rely on confidential information in future
investigations, this will not mean that defendants will receive all the information to
which they are entitled. Because of the nature of the ICC's work, neither the defense
nor Chambers can effectively police the OTP's compliance with its disclosure
obligations.'4 0 Defense counsel cannot know what other evidence might be available
134. See Whiting, supra note 112, at 231 (noting that prosecutors often err on the side of non-
disclosure). Cf. Zappala, supra note 123, at 623 (noting that changes to ICTY Rules concerning the
Prosecutor's disclosure obligations are likely to be ineffective because there is no way to verify whether
the Prosecutor fulfills his or her obligations).
135. Even if the Prosecutor did agree that certain materials need to be disclosed, the defense may still
be unable to obtain the actual documents if the information provider does not consent. Prosecutor v.
Lubanga, Judgment on Appeal of Disclosure Decision, supra note 85, para. 48 ("[W]here the material in
question was obtained on the condition of confidentiality, the Trial Chamber ... will have to respect the
confidentiality agreement concluded by the Prosecutor under Article 54(3)(e) . . .
136. Id. paras. 21, 32.
137. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 3.8(d) (2006).
138. See Sara Gurwitch, When Self-Policing Does Not Work, A Proposal for Policing Prosecutors in
Their Obligation to Provide Exculpatory Evidence to the Defense, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 303, 318-19
(2010) (discussing disciplinary procedures taken against prosecutors, including rare instances of criminal
prosecution).
139. See Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal Court, ICC-
ASP/1/3, art. 15(1) (September 3, 2002), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/23F24FDC-E9C2-4C43-
BE19-A19F5DDE8882/140090/Agreement-onPrivandImm_120704EN.pdf (stating that the Prosecutor
and Deputy Prosecutor enjoy "immunity from legal process of every kind in respect of ... acts which had
been performed by them in their official capacities").
140. The role of Chambers in ensuring the Prosecutor's compliance with his disclosure duties largely
appears to be confined to situations where the Prosecutor willingly submits evidence to Chambers so that
it may determine whether the evidence "tends to show the innocence of the accused, or to mitigate the
guilt of the accused, or which may affect the credibility of prosecution evidence." ICC Statute, supra note
1, art. 67(2).
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to the OTP because their own ability to gather evidence is highly limited due to non-
cooperation from governments and limited budgets for investigatory activities,"' and
because advocacy groups tend to be more focused on bringing accused war criminals
to justice than safeguarding their procedural rights.'42 For these reasons,
prosecutorial compliance with disclosure obligations is even more crucial than in
domestic systems.
This is not to say that the prosecutors in international criminal tribunals
deliberately take a narrow view of their disclosure obligations. Prosecutors may
simply underestimate the degree to which certain evidence "tends to show the
innocence of the accused, or to mitigate the guilt of the accused, or which may affect
the credibility of prosecution evidence."'43 For example, social psychology research
suggests that prosecutors are "likely to search the case evidence for proof confirming
the hypothesis to the detriment of exculpatory evidence."'" Once a prosecutor forms
a personal belief in guilt, "that belief becomes 'sticky' as selective information
processing, belief perseverance, and cognitive consistency will prevent the prosecutor
from revisiting her conclusion."145 To extrapolate these concerns to the OTP, by the
time that the duty to disclose evidence arises, OTP attorneys already will have
investigated and formed a strong belief that the defendant is likely guilty, or else they
would not have sought an arrest warrant for the defendant.' A review of whether
evidence must be disclosed to the defense under the ICC Statute takes place
therefore in the context of the OTP's relatively settled view of the defendant's guilt
and may lead the OTP to undervalue or simply dismiss evidence that does not cohere
with the defendant's guilt.
International criminal court prosecutors may be less likely to fulfill their
disclosure obligations than prosecutors in domestic systems because their review of
evidence often occurs against a backdrop of the crimes having already been referred
to the Court by state parties and/or the United Nations Security Council."'
Moreover, ICC defendants are charged with crimes that are of "most serious. ..
concern to the international community as a whole,"'48 and there is increased
pressure on prosecutors to convict and hold defendants responsible.1' A code of
conduct should seek to minimize the likelihood that the Prosecutor will fail to
141. See Turner, Defense Perspectives, supra note 122, at 556 (noting that defense counsel in
international criminal tribunals must at times place their own lives in jeopardy to carry out factual
investigation and are hampered by a lack of cooperation from governments in terms of evidence-gathering
and a lack of funding for investigation from the tribunals).
142. See supra note 54.
143. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 67(2).
144. Alafair Burke, Prosecutorial Agnosticism, 8 OHIO J. CRIM. L. 79, 80 (2010).
145. Id.
146. See Alafair Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L. J. 481, 495 (2009) [hereinafter
Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure] ("Because of confirmation bias, [a domestic prosecutor] is
likely to search the investigative file for evidence that confirms the defendant's guilt . . . ."); see also Ellen
Yaroshefsky, Keynote Address: Enhancing the Justice Mission in the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion,
19 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 343, 352 (2010) (noting that confirmation bias among police and
prosecutors helps contribute to wrongful convictions).
147. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 13(a)-(b) (identifying two means of referral by which the
Court may exercise jurisdiction).
148. Id. art. 5(1).
149. Robinson, supra note 54, at 929.
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comply with his disclosure obligations out of a desire, conscious or unconscious, that
ICC defendants must not go free.5 o
With these considerations in mind, I propose the following OTP code of
conduct rule. The proposed rule, as with others in this Article, is directed at the
Prosecutor but would apply to all OTP attorneys and staff.
Draft Conduct Rule Regarding Disclosure Obligations
(1) To the extent disclosure is not otherwise prohibited by the ICC
Statute or Rules, the Prosecutor shall ensure that the defense is not
denied access to investigatory materials in the possession, custody,
or control of the OTP.
(2) Notwithstanding (1) above, the Prosecutor may provide
assurances to individuals or organizations providing information on
the condition of confidentiality pursuant to Article 54(3)(e) if (i) the
Prosecutor determines that the materials cannot be obtained via
other means and (ii) the individual or organization would not
provide the materials except under the condition of confidentiality.'
(3) Prior to offering any assurances under Article 54(3)(e), the
Prosecutor shall inform the person or organization providing
information of the Prosecutor's duties under Article 67(2) and that
such duties shall take precedence over the confidentiality of the
information, although the Prosecutor shall not disclose any
documents directly to the defense without first receiving consent
from the individual or organization providing the information.15
(4) If consent cannot be obtained to disclose materials obtained
pursuant to Article 54(3)(e), but the materials must be disclosed
pursuant to Article 67(2), the Prosecutor shall endeavor to provide
the materials to the defense in a summary or redacted form1 53 or in
some other form ordered by Chambers.1 54
150. Professor Burke suggests other mechanisms beyond ethical rules that can assist prosecutors in
complying with their disclosure duties. For example, she has suggested that prosecutors should be trained
to recognize their own cognitive biases and should consider allowing colleagues who are not as familiar
with a particular case to determine whether a particular piece of evidence should be disclosed to the
defense. Alafair Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1617-18, 1621-23 (2006). In light of the history of problems with respect to
disclosure in international criminal trials, such measures merit the strong consideration of the OTP.
151. See Ambos, supra note 101, at 555-56 (arguing that "the Prosecutor should conclude
confidentiality agreements only under three conditions: first, there is no other 'normal' way to obtain the
respective information; second, the information is absolutely necessary to continue the investigation; and
third, the information is only requested to generate new evidence").
152. See ICC Rules, supra note 35, R. 82(1) ("Where material or information is in the possession or
control of the Prosecutor which is protected under Article 54, paragraph 3(e), the Prosecutor may not
subsequently introduce such material or information into evidence without the prior consent of the
provider of the material or information and adequate prior disclosure to the accused.").
153. The ICC Statute contemplates that materials implicating national security information may be
presented in such a form. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 72(5)(d) (listing "providing summaries or
redactions" as an option to resolve cases where a State maintains that disclosure would prejudice its
national security interests).
154. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Judgment on Appeal of Disclosure Decision, supra note 85, para. 48
(holding that the Chamber must determine which counter-balancing measures can be taken should a party
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(5) In construing disclosure obligations under Article 67(2), the
Prosecutor shall err toward disclosure to the defense. If there is
doubt whether a document must be disclosed, the Prosecutor shall
consult the relevant Chamber.155
If the ICC shares this Article's concerns regarding disclosure in international
criminal trials, the proposed rule would be beneficial inasmuch as it discourages both
the excessive use of confidentiality agreements and the practice of prosecutors
construing their disclosure obligations under Article 67(2) of the ICC Statute
narrowly, while still recognizing the importance of the Prosecutor's powers under
Article 54(3)(e). Moreover, the proposed rule would warn information providers
that information conveyed to the OTP on the condition of confidentiality may
nevertheless need to be disclosed so that the information providers can meaningfully
assess whether to cooperate with the Prosecutor.
B. The Prosecutor's Duty to Obey Chambers vs. the Duty of Independence
1. The Prosecutor's Refusal to Comply with an Order of the Lubanga Trial
Chamber
The Lubanga Trial Chamber imposed a second indefinite stay on July 8, 2010,
after the Prosecutor failed to comply with the Trial Chamber's order to disclose the
identity of an intermediary who had introduced witnesses against Mr. Lubanga to the
Prosecutor.156 Defense witnesses' testimony had "put into question" the testimony of
prosecution witnesses facilitated by the intermediary, and the Trial Chamber ordered
that the intermediary's identity be disclosed to the defense.' The Prosecutor
refused because of his professed concern that measures had not yet been
implemented to protect the intermediary."' The Trial Chamber not only ordered a
stay in the proceedings59 but warned the Prosecutor that he could be subject to
sanctions under Article 71 of the ICC Statute and Rule 171 of the ICC Rules if he
continued to refuse to provide the intermediary's name to the defense team.60 The
Trial Chamber subsequently issued an oral order that Mr. Lubanga be immediately
released because in its view Mr. Lubanga's right to a fair trial had been
not consent to disclosure).
155. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 67(2) (stating that "the Court shall decide" if there is any
doubt about what the Prosecutor must disclose).
156. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2517, Decision on Request for Variation of
Time-Limit to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary, paras. 12, 31 (July 8, 2010), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc906146.pdf; Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2582, Judgment on
Appeal of Request for Variation of Time-Limit to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary, para. 5 (Oct. 8,
2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc947768.pdf.
157. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Judgment on Appeal of Request for Variation of Time-Limit to
Disclose the Identity of Intermediary, supra note 154, paras. 4-5, 7 (detailing the procedural chronology of
the Trial Chamber's order).
158. See id. paras. 11-12 (quoting the Prosecutor's filings on the date of refusal).
159. Id. para. 13.
160. Id. para. 17. Rule 171(2) of the ICC's Rules of Procedure and Evidence states that participants
in ICC proceedings can be sanctioned for a "deliberate refusal to comply with an oral or written direction
by the Court." ICC Rules, supra note 35, R. 171(2). The Chamber may impose measures ranging from
the interdiction of the offending individual from exercising his or her functions before the Court, as well as
fines up to the amount of 2,000 euros a day. Id. R. 171(2), (4).
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compromised, and he could not be held in preventative custody on the assumption
that his trial would resume at some point in the future.161 The order was stayed
pending appeal.1 2
In October 2010, the Appeals Chamber issued a judgment that criticized the
Prosecutor for refusing to comply with the order.'6 1 It held that "[n]o criminal court
can operate on the basis that whenever it makes an order in a particular area, it is for
the Prosecutor to elect whether or not to implement it, depending on his
interpretation of his obligations."'" The Appeals Chamber explained that all Trial
Chamber orders were binding orders that had to be implemented by the Prosecutor,
unless they were modified by the Trial Chamber or reversed by the Appeals
Chamber."' The Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber's imposition of a
stay, however, on the ground that sanctions had not first been imposed on the
Prosecutor under Article 71 to ensure his compliance with the Trial Chamber
order.'" Because Mr. Lubanga's release was based on the stay, the Appeals
Chamber also reversed the Trial Chamber's order of release.16 1
Although the Lubanga trial has now resumed, the disruption in the proceedings
was arguably unnecessary.'" The Draft OTP Code and the ICC's Code for Counsel
require attorneys to comply with orders from Chambers.6 9 Since the OTP has not
formulated a code of conduct, however, the Prosecutor was under no such ethical
obligation and the question of whether to obey the Lubanga Trial Chamber could be
reduced to whether the perceived benefits of non-compliance justified incurring the
risk of sanction. The Prosecutor's actions in this regard underscore the importance
of ethical rules as providing a possible constraint on this type of gamesmanship.'
161. Press Release, Int'l Crim. Ct., Trial Chamber I Orders the Release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo-
Implementation of the Decision is Pending, ICC-CPI-20100715-PR559 (July 15, 2010), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/Go?id=16daad8-501a-46dc-b744-9bdc657cOac9&lan=en-GB.
162. Id.; Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Judgment on Appeal of Request for Variation of Time-Limit to
Disclose the Identity of Intermediary, supra note 156, para. 17.
163. See generally Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Judgment on Appeal of Request for Variation of Time-
Limit to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary, supra note 156.
164. Id. para. 48.
165. Id.
166. Id. para. 59.
167. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2583, Judgment on Appeal of Decision to
Release Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, para. 24 (Oct. 8, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc947862.pdf.
The Appeals Chamber noted the Trial Chamber's attachment of significance to the length of Mr.
Lubanga's detention, but reasoned that the Trial Chamber had made no findings that the detention was no
longer necessary for trial or that Mr. Lubanga was detained for an unreasonable period on account of
prosecutorial delay. Id. para. 25.
168. See Kevin Jon Heller, I Think It's Time to Remove Moreno-Ocampo, OPINtO JURIS (July 9, 2010,
8:23 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/07/09/i-think-its-time-to-remove-moreno-ocampo (asserting that
Moreno-Ocampo's misuse of confidentiality agreements caused "unwarranted delay" in the trial).
169. Draft OTP Code, supra note 8, art. 14(7); Code for Counsel, supra note 22, art. 7(3). See also
ICC Rules, supra note 27, R. 25(1)(a)(ii) (defining misconduct to include failing to comply with directions
from a presiding judge).
170. See HAZARD & DONDI, supra note 45, at 8 (suggesting that ethical rules indicate to lawyers "the
right thing to do"); see also Geoffrey Hazard & Dana Irwin, Toward a Revised 4.2 No-Contact Rule, 60
HASTINGS L.J. 797, 804 (2009) (noting that protecting the "proper functioning of the legal system" is a
central purpose of all ethical rules).
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However, even if the ICC had adopted the Draft OTP Code, the Prosecutor
may have chosen to disobey the order that he disclose the identity of the
intermediary. The Prosecutor justified his conduct to the Appeals Chamber by
claiming that:
The Prosecutor is sensitive to its obligations to comply with the
Chamber's instructions. However, it also has an independent
statutory obligation to protect persons put at risk on account of the
Prosecutor's actions. It should not comply, or be asked to comply,
with an order that may require it to violate the separate statutory
obligation by subjecting the person to a foreseeable risk."
The Prosecutor was arguably correct to claim that he faced a choice between
obeying the Trial Chamber and fulfilling his obligations under the ICC Statute
because the Statute specifically contemplates that "the Prosecutor shall . . . respect
the rights, interests, and personal circumstances of victims and witnesses" and
furthermore may take "measures ... to ensure the confidentiality of information and
the protection of any person . . . .",2 The OTP also has the overarching duty to "act
independently as a separate organ of the Court."'7 In the Prosecutor's view, if he
had complied with the Trial Chamber's order, he would have placed the
intermediary's life in danger.
If the Draft OTP Code had been adopted, the Prosecutor still would have been
faced with the same ethical dilemma. Although the Draft OTP Code requires
prosecutors to comply with Trial Chamber orders,"' it also provides that a prosecutor
shall "[c]onduct his or her investigations with the goal of ... ensuring confidentiality
[and] fully respecting the rights of all persons under the Statute."'7  What may
appear initially as audacious conduct by the Prosecutor, on closer examination could
be seen as a genuine disagreement as to whether the Prosecutor's duty to obey
orders from Chambers should be absolute or whether the Prosecutor could exercise
his independence and refuse to comply with orders that conflict with his statutory
duties.
This is not to suggest that the Prosecutor acted properly in violating the Trial
Chamber's order, particularly where the obligation to protect potential witnesses
appears to lie primarily with other organs of the ICC and may be subordinate to Mr.
Lubanga's right to a fair trial.'76 For example, Article 64(2) of the ICC Statute states
171. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Judgment on Appeal of Request for Variation of Time-Limit to Disclose
the Identity of Intermediary, supra note 156, para. 12.
172. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 54(l)(a), 54(3)(f). In addition, Article 68(1) states that measures
to protect the "safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity, and privacy of victims and witnesses"
shall be taken by the Prosecutor "particularly during the investigation and prosecution of ... crimes." Id.
art. 68(1).
173. Id. art. 42(1).
174. Draft OTP Code, supra note 8, art. 14(7).
175. Id. art. 8(4).
176. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Judgment on Appeal of Request for Variation of Time-Limit to
Disclose the Identity of Intermediary, supra note 156, paras. 5(-51 (holding that it is ultimately the job of
the Trial Chamber to deal with matters such as witness and victim protection); see also Kevin Jon Heller,
The OTP's Supposed "Independent Statutory Obligation" to Protect Witnesses, OPINIo JURIS (July 9, 2010,
8:41 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/07/09/the-otps-non-existent-independent-statutory-obligation-to-
protect-witnesses (arguing that the ICC Statute permits, but does not require, the Prosecutor to protect
the confidentiality of persons whereas the Trial Chamber is required to take measures to protect witnesses
that are not prejudicial to a defendant's right to a fair trial).
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that it is the Trial Chamber that ensures "due regard for the protection of victims and
witnesses," and under Article 68(1), the Prosecutor's ability to take measures to
protect the safety of victims and witnesses "shall not be prejudicial to or inconsistent
with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial.""' However, one can
certainly disagree with the Prosecutor's conduct in this instance and still accept the
broader principle that, since the OTP and Chambers are independent organs of the
Court, the Trial Chamber should not be able to cause the Prosecutor to violate his
duties under the ICC Statute.'
2. Obedience and Independence
It is tempting to believe that the OTP will never again refuse to comply with a
Trial Chamber order. The Appeals Chamber's judgment makes clear that "when
there is a conflict between the Prosecutor's perception of his duties and the orders of
the Trial Chamber, the Trial Chamber's orders must prevail." 179  However, the
Prosecutor has never disputed that he had a duty to comply with orders from
Chambers.'so Rather, the Prosecutor's position was that he could violate a Trial
Chamber order if he was willing to be held in contempt."' The Prosecutor's
brinkmanship was rewarded when the Appeals Chamber overturned the Trial
Chamber's decision to release Lubanga.8 2 Unfortunately, the Prosecutor's "victory"
seems to have undermined the ICC's credibility,'83 and galvanized Lubanga's
supporters,' making it less likely that the Lubanga trial will foster reconciliation in
the DRC or further other transitional justice goals.
The Appeals Chamber's judgment cannot ensure that the Prosecutor will
hereafter obey all future orders from Chambers, particularly if the Prosecutor is
willing to be held in contempt for failing to comply with orders.' What is needed is
177. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 64(2), 68(1).
178. This conflict does not appear as frequently in domestic systems because, unlike the ICC
Prosecutor, domestic prosecutors are employees of a state and, as such, are not expected to have the same
degree of independence. See Danner, supra note 4, at 537 ("Unlike the close linkage between prosecutors
and the executive in some domestic systems, the ICC Prosecutor is designed to be politically independent
of governments. The purpose of this independence is to divorce him from any political objective other
than fulfilling the mandate of the court."). Domestic prosecutors also can be dismissed much more easily.
179. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Judgment on Appeal of Request for Variation of Time-Limit to Disclose
the Identity of Intermediary, supra note 156, para. 48.
180. See id. para. 32 ("[T]he Prosecutor contends that he did not refuse to comply with the orders of
the Court but instead exercised rights available to him as a party.").
181. See id. para. 34 (noting that the Prosecutor had argued that the Trial Chamber should have cited
him for contempt or imposed other remedies instead of ordering the release of Mr. Lubanga).
182. Id. para. 62.
183. See Michael Steen, War Crimes Court Set to Free Congo Warlord, FIN. TIMES, July 15, 2010, at 7
("Human rights groups had said the long-delayed Lubanga case was perhaps a final chance for the ICC to
prove that it could be an efficient forum to try serious war crime allegations.").
184. See Olivia Bueno, Kabila's Visit Highlights Tension Over Lubanga Trial, LUBANGATRIAL.ORG
(Sept. 24, 2010), http://www.lubangatrial.org/2010/09/24/kabilaE2%80%99s-visit-highlights-tension-
over-lubanga-trial ("According to Congolese activists, the UPC is calling for the unconditional liberation
of Lubanga following the Trial Chamber's July 15, 2010 ruling.").
185. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the Appeals Chamber's judgment concerned only whether
the Prosecutor had been justified in refusing to disclose the intermediary's name out of concern for the
intermediary's safety. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Judgment on Appeal of Request for Variation of Time-
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an ethical commitment on the part of the Prosecutor to obey all orders from
Chambers, regardless of the Prosecutor's other obligations.'8 6 For example, the ICC's
Code for Counsel provides that "[c]ounsel shall comply at all times with .. . rulings as
to conduct and procedure as may be made by the Court."'"' A similar code of
conduct rule for OTP attorneys would help to ensure that ICC proceedings are not
again delayed as a result of the Prosecutor's refusal to follow orders from Chambers.
However, a potential pitfall might be that the Prosecutor would be ethically required
to follow all orders, even orders that are manifestly unjust or clearly cause him to
violate the ICC Statute.
The notion that the OTP code of conduct should ever allow the Prosecutor to
violate orders from Chambers could well prove controversial. The drafters of the
OTP Code of Conduct may be wary of giving the Prosecutor this power. However,
given that the OTP and Chambers are independent organs of the Court with separate
statutory responsibilities, there may indeed be some circumstances under which the
Prosecutor should be able to disobey orders that fundamentally infringe on his duties
under the ICC Statute. Such a view of the Prosecutor's role would be consistent with
the position that attorneys should generally be prepared to disobey lawful orders and
risk sanction in order to promote broader goals of justice."
One can conceive of a situation where the ICC Statute arguably requires that
the Prosecutor violate an order from the Trial Chamber. For example, Article 42(7)
of the ICC Statute provides that the Prosecutor shall not "participate in any matter
in which [his] impartiality might reasonably be doubted on any ground."1 89 However,
the Trial Chamber is not required to excuse the Prosecutor from the proceedings.'9 0
Consequently, the Prosecutor could request to be disqualified from a particular case
because of a personal conflict of interest,19 ' but his request could be rebuffed by the
Trial Chamber.9 2 The Prosecutor would then have to choose either to obey the
direction of the Trial Chamber and continue to participate in the proceedings or
refuse to do so pursuant to his statutory obligation under Article 42(7). Under these
Limit to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary, supra note 156, para. 5.
186. The code of conduct could reflect the view of the Appeals Chamber that "[irrespective of
whatever duties the Prosecutor may have, he is obliged to comply with the orders of the Trial Chamber."
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Judgment on Appeal of Request for Variation of Time-Limit to Disclose the
Identity of Intermediary, supra note 156, para. 54.
187. Code for Counsel, supra note 22, art. 7(3).
188. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Should Lawyers Obey the Law?, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 217, 238-
39 (1997) (discussing films that show that "[plopular respect for law may require lawyers to violate the
positive law"); Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter's Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEX. L. REV.
259, 310-11 (1995) (describing the archetype of the moral individualist who "pursue[s] any legal ends that
[he or she] believe[s] to be morally right, by any means that meet the same criterion"). One can certainly
construe the Prosecutor's refusal to release the intermediary's name to the defense as emblematic of the
moral individualist insofar as the Prosecutor sought to protect the intermediary regardless of the costs to
the OTP.
189. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 42(7).
190. See id. art. 42(6) (stating that the Prosecutor "may" be excused by the Presidency).
191. Id.
192. One would expect, of course, that the Trial Chamber would allow the Prosecutor to recuse
himself from acting in a particular case, but if the Prosecutor raised the issue at a relatively late juncture, it
is certainly conceivable that the Chamber would deny a request in order to not delay the trial. Such a
decision, like the Trial Chamber's order to disclose the identity of the intermediary, could not be appealed
without leave of the Trial Chamber. See generally id. art. 82(1)(d) (stating that an appeal of a Trial
Chamber "decision that involves an issue that would significantly affect the fair and expeditious conduct of
the proceedings or the outcome of the trial" can be pursued with approval of the Trial Chamber).
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circumstances, it would not seem unreasonable for the Prosecutor to incur the risk of
sanction rather than taint the proceedings with his participation."
In domestic practice as well, lawyers also are occasionally forced to choose
between following ethical obligations and obeying court orders. In the United
States, for example, attorneys are generally forbidden from revealing "information
relating to the representation of a client."' 4 Similarly, in Canada, a lawyer is
required "to hold in strict confidence all information acquired in the course of the
professional relationship concerning the business and affairs of the client," whereas
in Japan, an attorney shall not "disclose or utilize, without any good reason,
confidential information of a client which is obtained in the course of his or her
practice."l.95 However, a judge may order a lawyer to disclose information he or she
receives from the client, and it is unclear whether the lawyer may refuse to provide
this information.' Courts have differed on this issue.' Whereas attorneys in
domestic settings can draw on their countries' legal traditions and may be able to
seek guidance from professional associations and ethics experts to help resolve
ethical dilemmas of this type, this is not a practical option for OTP attorneys because
the ICC is sui generis.
In my view, it would be preferable for an OTP code of conduct to specify under
what circumstances prosecutors may refuse to comply with orders from Chambers
and risk sanction so that the ICC can better anticipate when ethical dilemmas may
arise that could delay and jeopardize proceedings. One of the reasons that the
Prosecutor's refusal to comply with the Trial Chamber's order to disclose the identity
of the intermediary was so controversial in the Lubanga case was that the Trial
Chamber had not encroached on the Prosecutor's responsibilities. Witness safety is
equally a matter of concern for Chambers and the Registry under the ICC Statute. 9 8
To the extent one accepts the premise that the Prosecutor should be able to refuse to
obey some orders from Chambers, the Prosecutor's discretion to do so should be
limited to instances where Chambers is infringing on the OTP's independence or
truly causing him to violate his other statutory duties.
I propose the following rule:
193. This is particularly the case if one keeps in mind the broader goals of international criminal
justice. See generally supra Part I(B).
194. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT. R. 1.6(a) (2006).
195. HAZARD & DONDI, supra note 45, at 205 (citations omitted).
196. In the United States, the operative rule is found in MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6
cmt. 12 (2006) ("Other law may require that a lawyer disclose information about a client. Whether such a
law supersedes Rule 1.6 is a question of law beyond the scope of these Rules.").
197. See People v. Belge, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798, 803 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979), affd 41 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1976)
(holding that a lawyer cannot be charged for failing to disclose the location of a murder victim where he
learned of the location from his client). But see Matter of Doe, 20 N.Y.S.2d 996, 999 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979)
(holding that a lawyer was required to answer a grand jury question concerning the location of his client
where he learned of the location from the client).
198. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Judgment on Appeal of Request for Variation of Time-Limit to Disclose
the Identity of Intermediary, supra note 156, para. 50 (noting that the Trial Chamber must ensure that the
trial is conducted with "due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses"). See also ICC Statute,
supra note 1, art. 68(1) ("The Court shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety... of victims
and witnesses.") and art. 43(6) (outlining the Registrar's duty to provide "protective measures and security
arrangements" for witnesses and "victims who appear before the Court").
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Draft Conduct Rule Regarding Duty to Chambers
(1) The Prosecutor shall have a duty to comply with orders from
Chambers.199
(2) In a situation where the Prosecutor reasonably believes that an
order from Chambers would cause the Prosecutor to violate one of
his or her duties under the ICC Statute, the Prosecutor shall explain,
in writing, the duty that he or she is being asked to violate and seek
reconsideration of that order.
(3) If the Prosecutor is unable to have an order from Chambers
modified or vacated, and the order cannot be appealed, the
Prosecutor shall comply with the order unless the Prosecutor
reasonably believes that the order encroaches on his or her full
authority over the proper management and administration of the
OTP. 200
(4) If the Prosecutor cannot comply with an order pursuant to (3)
above, the Prosecutor may withdraw from the proceedings or take
such other measures as he or she deems necessary after consultation
201
with the Presidency.
The proposed rule would not have permitted the Prosecutor to refuse to
disclose the identity of the intermediary in the Lubanga case because the
Prosecutor's obligation to protect the intermediary was permissive, not mandatory,202
and the ICC Statute does not confer the responsibility to protect witnesses and
victims on the OTP alone. 203 The proposed rule would, however, potentially allow
the Prosecutor to refuse to obey an order that he participate in a case in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned because complying with such an order
would both cause the Prosecutor to violate the ICC Statute and would encroach on
the Prosecutor's "management and administration of the OTP."204
199. Code for Counsel, supra note 22, art. 7(3).
200. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 42(2) ("The Prosecutor shall have full authority over the
management and administration of the Office.").
201. The Presidency is composed of three judges of the Court and has three main responsibilities:
"judicial/legal functions, administration and external relations." The Presidency, INT'L CRIM. CT., http://
www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Presidency. The Presidency is currently composed of
Judges Song, Diarra, and Kaul. Id.
202. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 54(3)(f) ("The Prosecutor may take necessary measures ... to
ensure the confidentiality of information, the protection of any person or the preservation of evidence."
(emphasis added)).
203. See, e.g., id. art. 68 ("The Court shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical
and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses.").
204. Id. art. 42(2). Another potential example, taken from recent cases in New York, would be if the
Trial Chamber ordered the Prosecutor to assign an individual of a particular religion or nationality to the
prosecution team. See Jason Mazzone, Judge Baer and Grutter v. Bollinger, BALKINIZATION (Oct. 29,
2010, 9:10 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/10/judge-baer-and-grutter-v-bollinger.html (reporting that
in two separate cases Judge Baer required at least one minority and one woman co-counsel for a class
action suit). Such an order also would violate the Prosecutor's independence as well as interfere with his
management of the OTP.
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III. THE OTP's PUBLIC STATEMENTS: THE DUTY OF IMPARTIALITY
AND THE DUTY TO PROSECUTE
The OTP has made several controversial public statements in the course of the
ICC's early cases. In this section, I will explore the inherent tension between the
Prosecutor's duty of impartiality, which is illustrated by his obligation to seek the
truth,2 0 5 "investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally,"" and
"[f]ully respect the rights of persons arising under the Statute[,]" 207 with his duty to
"[t]ake appropriate measures to ensure the effective ... prosecution of crimes." 20 8
This conflict is illustrated by certain controversial comments made by the Prosecutor
in advocating for the arrest of Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir
("Al-Bashir").
A. Darfur and the Prosecutor's Editorial
On July 14, 2008, the Prosecutor sought to obtain an arrest warrant for
Sudanese President Al-Bashir for crimes committed in the Darfur region of Sudan
from March 2003 to July 2008.29 The Pre-Trial Chamber granted the arrest warrant
with respect to crimes against humanity and war crimes but rejected the Prosecutor's
application with respect to genocide.2t o
The Appeals Chamber reversed the Pre-Trial Chamber's decision, holding that
the Pre-Trial Chamber had misapplied the correct standard of proof required for an
arrest warrant under Article 58(1) of the ICC Statute. 2 1' Article 58(1) states, inter
alia, that an arrest warrant will be issued where "[t]here are reasonable grounds to
believe that the person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court."2 12
In the view of the Appeals Chamber, the Pre-Trial Chamber had erred in construing
"reasonable grounds to believe" in the context of genocide to require that the
Prosecutor demonstrate that the only conclusion that could be drawn from the
Prosecutor's evidence was that Mr. Al-Bashir had acted with genocidal intent.21 3 The
Pre-Trial Chamber subsequently issued an arrest warrant against Al-Bashir for
genocide as well as crimes against humanity and war crimes.2 14
A few days later, the Prosecutor authored an editorial for the Guardian entitled
Now End This Darfur Denial.2 15 The editorial made several controversial claims. For
205. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 54(1)(a).
206. Id.
207. Id. art. 54(1)(c).
208. Id. art. 54(1)(b).
209. Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Case No. [CC-02/05-01/09-73, Judgment on Appeal Against Decision
on Warrant of Arrest, para. 2 (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc817795.pdf.
210. Id. para. 3.
211. Id. paras. 41-42.
212. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 58(1)(a).
213. Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Judgment on Appeal Against Decision on Warrant of Arrest, supra
note 209, para. 39.
214. Press Release, Int'l Crim. Ct., Pre-Trial Chamber I Issues a Second Warrant of Arrest Against
Omar Al Bashir for Counts of Genocide, ICC-CPI-20100712-PR557 (July 12, 2010), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/Go?id=1f037bee-e5a7-4421-ab24-d050d84cd347&lan=en-GB.
215. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Now End This Darfur Denial, GUARDIAN, July 15, 2010, at 33.
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example, it claimed that the Pre-Trial Chamber had found that "Bashir's forces have
raped on a mass scale in Darfur" and "deliberately inflict[ed] on the Fur, Masalit and
Zaghawa ethnic groups living conditions calculated to bring about their physical
destruction." 216  Of course, the Pre-Trial Chamber made no such "finding"
whatsoever because the only question before it was whether the Prosecutor had
satisfied his burden under Article 58(1) to demonstrate that there were "reasonable
grounds" to believe that Mr. Al-Bashir had committed the crimes in question so that
an arrest warrant should be issued.217 This is a far lesser showing than the "beyond
reasonable doubt" standard that the Prosecutor would have to satisfy to prove that
Al-Bashir actually committed these crimes.218 As Professor Schabas has suggested,
the Prosecutor's editorial was highly misleading inasmuch as some Guardian readers
might reasonably believe that the Court had found Al-Bashir guilty.219 Professor
Heller has gone so far as to claim that the editorial demonstrated such poor
judgment that the ASP should have considered removing the Prosecutor from
office.220
This was not the first time that a member of the OTP has made controversial
public statements concerning a pending case. The Trial Chamber had previously
strongly criticized B6atrice Le Fraper du Hellen, the head of the OTP's Jurisdiction,
Complementarity and Cooperation Division, for an interview that she had given to
an internet website.22 1 Ms. Le Fraper du Hellen had claimed that the witnesses who
had been identified by intermediaries in the Lubanga trial were highly credible,222
that the defense was "fishing for arguments" in seeking to discern the identity of
certain intermediaries,223 and that Mr. Lubanga would be "going away for a long
time."24 The Trial Chamber criticized the OTP's conduct but did not impose formal
sanctions.225
In its decision, the Trial Chamber expressed concern that public statements
were essentially unregulated by the ICC Statute framework226 and reminded the OTP
that "the public needs to be able to trust the published statements of those involved
in [a] case .... It is important that in media statements there is a clear and accurate
description as to whether issues that are reported have been decided or are still
216. Id. Under the ICC Statute, if the Prosecutor's claims are proven true, Mr. Al-Bashir would be
guilty of genocide. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 6(c) ("'Genocide' means ... [d]eliberately inflicting
on [a] group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.").
217. Kevin Jon Heller, The Remarkable Arrogance of the ICC Prosecutor, OPINIO JURIS (July 20,
2010, 9:33 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/07/20/the-remarkable-arrogance-of-the-icc-prosecutor.
218. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 66(3).
219. Heller, supra note 217 (quoting William Schabas).
220. See id. (detailing the Prosecutor's misleading statements in the editorial and his refusal to
comply with the Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case and suggesting that "if things don't get better in a
hurry, the Assembly of States Parties needs to consider removing him"). See also Joshua Rozenberg, ICC
Prosecutors Should Not Be Grandstanding in Their Own Cases, GUARDIAN, Aug. 18, 2010, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2010/aug/18luis-moreno-ocampo-omar-bashir ("If Moreno-Ocampo had
spent less time grandstanding and more time in court, he may have concluded his first case by now.").
221. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2433, Decision on the Press Interview with Ms
Le Fraper du Hellen, paras. 1, 53 (May 12, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc870208.pdf.
222. Id. para. 6.
223. Id. para. 5.
224. Id. para. 8.
225. Id. para. 53.
226. Id. para. 34.
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unresolved." 2 27 The Prosecutor published his misleading Darfur editorial less than
two months after the Trial Chamber's admonishment of Ms. Le Fraper du Hellen.
The OTP obviously should not misrepresent the nature of the Court's work or
seek to inflame public opinion against defendants. This would seem to follow from
the duty to seek the truth2 28 and to "[f]ully respect the rights of persons arising under
the [ICC] Statute,"22 9 which includes the right of Mr. Al-Bashir and other defendants
to "be presumed innocent until proved guilty before the Court."230 Nevertheless, as
noted by the Trial Chamber, the ICC Statute does not regulate public statements by
the OTP,23 ' and there are no specific prohibitions that prevent the Prosecutor from
making inflammatory and potentially misleading remarks about defendants.
Moreover, the OTP's actions should be seen in context. In terms of Ms. Le Fraper
du Hellen's comments, if one accepts that part of the function of international
criminal justice is to educate and create a historical record,23 2 then it is
understandable that the OTP would want to publicly fight accusations that it was
engaged in wrongdoing in the Lubanga case by relying on allegedly unreliable
intermediaries to assist in the gathering of evidence.2 33
The Darfur editorial too can be somewhat justified because the ICC Statute
requires the Prosecutor to "[tiake appropriate measures to ensure the effective...
prosecution of crimes,"2 34 which includes ensuring that perpetrators of these crimes
are brought to justice.23 5 Bringing Al-Bashir to justice has proven exceedingly
difficult as state parties to the ICC have refused to enforce the Court's arrest
warrant.236 Indeed, the African Union halted all cooperation with the ICC as a result
of the ICC's decision to issue an arrest warrant for Mr. Al-Bashir.2 37 Consequently,
the Prosecutor's strident editorial could be seen as part of an effort of "naming and
shaming" other nations to bring Mr. Al-Bashir to justice.238 This does not excuse
227. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on the Press Interview with Ms Le Fraper du Hellen, supra
note 221, para. 39.
228. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 54(1)(a).
229. Id. art. 54(1)(c).
230. Id. art. 66(1).
231. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on the Press Interview with Ms Le Fraper du Hellen, supra
note 221, para. 34.
232. See supra note 58.
233. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Decision on the Press Interview with Ms Fraper du Hellen, supra
note 221, para. 49. Ms. Fraper du Hellen's comment that Mr. Lubanga would be "going away for a long
time," id. para. 8, is much more problematic inasmuch as it could be seen to imply that Mr. Lubanga would
not receive a fair and impartial trial.
234. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 54(1)(b).
235. Triffterer, supra note 75, at 1081.
236. See, e.g., Alan Cowell, Sudan Leader Travels Despite Warrant, NY TIMES, Aug. 27, 2010,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/28/world/africa/28sudan.html (describing an example of
Kenya disregarding the international warrant); African Union Refuses to Cooperate with Bashir Arrest
Warrant, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (July 6, 2009), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/african-
union-refuses-cooperate-bashir-arrest-warrant-20090706 (describing the African Union's refusal to
cooperate).
237. African Union in Rift with Court, BBC NEWS (July 3, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
8133925.stm.
238. "Naming and shaming" is an example of bottom-up human rights advocacy practiced by non-
state actors (chiefly non-governmental organizations). See David Tolbert & Andrew Solomon, United
Nations Reform and Supporting the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Societies, 19 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 29, 55-
57 (2006). It should be noted that "naming and shaming" has not been particularly effective when applied
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misleading the public as to the nature of the Court's work, but in light of the lack of
guidance offered by the ICC Statute as to what type of public statements, if any,
prosecutors may make about pending cases, it is not surprising that the OTP used its
discretion to aggressively lobby through the media for Mr. Al-Bashir's capture.
B. Possible Approaches Concerning Extrajudicial Speech
Given the criticism that the OTP has faced for the Darfur editorial and the Le
Fraper du Hellen interview, the OTP code of conduct should provide guidance as to
what type of public comments prosecutors may make. The Draft OTP Code seems
to disfavor any public pronouncements by OTP attorneys:
Prosecutors shall ... [a]void making public comments outside the
courtroom including, inter alia, speaking to the media about the
merits of particular cases or the guilt or innocence of certain accused
before judgment by the Court, and making any public statements
regarding the character, credibility, reputation, or record of an
accused.23
One possible problem with the proposed rule is that it does not depend on the
phase of a given case. If a defendant is at-large, like Mr. Al-Bashir is, it is unrealistic
to expect the OTP to "avoid making public comments." Compliance with the rule
could be contrary to the Prosecutor's obligation to "[t]ake appropriate measures to
ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of crimes." 24 0 Moreover, the
credibility of the entire Court may suffer if the OTP is precluded from responding to
misrepresentations about the OTP's work. In this regard, the Draft OTP Code
would create an asymmetry because ICC defense attorneys would be able to make
public statements concerning pending cases as long as the statements do not bring
the Court into disrepute,241 whereas the Prosecutor would be unable to respond
publicly to even baseless accusations and distortions.
In the United States, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules")
suggest a different approach. Model Rule 3.6 forbids lawyers from making "any
extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be
disseminated by means of public communication and will have a substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding." 24 2  Prosecutors
specifically are required to "refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a
substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused" pursuant
to Model Rule 3.8.243 Because these Rules are primarily concerned with prejudice
and harm to the defendant, however, prosecutors can publicly convey such
against Sudan. See Anonymous, Ensuring a Responsibility to Protect: Lessons from Darfur, 14 No. 2
HUM. RTS. BRIEF 26, 27 (2007) ("The traditional tactic of 'naming and shaming' used by Human Rights
Watch, Amnesty International, and the UN ... among others, has proved to be largely ineffective to
persuade Sudan to end its abuses.").
239. Draft OTP Code, supra note 8, art. 17(1).
240. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 54(1)(b).
241. See Code for Counsel, supra note 22, art. 24(1) (stating that "[c]ounsel shall take all necessary
steps to ensure that his or her actions or those of counsel's assistants or staff are not prejudicial to the
ongoing proceedings and do not bring the Court into disrepute").
242. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 3.6(a) (2006).
243. Id. R. 3.8(f).
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information as the allegations involved,244 information that is a matter of public
record,245 and the current status of an investigation.246 Prosecutors also are permitted
to warn of dangers associated with the accused and, if the accused has not been
apprehended, provide information necessary to aid in apprehension of that person.24
The Model Rules permit these types of comments even though "a prosecutor's
extrajudicial statement can create the additional problem of increasing public
condemnation of the accused."248 The rationale is that the "public has a right to know
about threats to its safety and measures aimed at assuring security." 249
Furthermore, under the Model Rules, attorneys are permitted to respond to
prejudicial statements made by opposing parties as long as the statements are limited
to counteracting adverse publicity on the proceedings.2 50  Such statements are
permissible because of the recognition that "[w]hen prejudicial statements have been
publicly made by others, responsive statements may have the salutary effect of
lessening any resulting adverse impact on the adjudicative proceeding." 21'
Obviously U.S. rules concerning extrajudicial speech by prosecutors and other
attorneys may not seem an ideal fit for an international criminal tribunal, particularly
one that is a hybrid of common and civil law traditions. Nevertheless, the Model
Rules' approach attempts to balance respect for the rights of defendants with
prosecutors' interest in effective prosecution and could serve as a useful starting
point for any deliberations concerning the OTP's responsibilities when making
extrajudicial statements.
To fulfill his duty to "[t]ake appropriate measures to ensure the effective
investigation and prosecution of crimes,"252 the Prosecutor likely will need to
publicize crimes that are of "most serious concern to the international community as
a whole"253 so as to obtain cooperation with his investigations and to ensure the
appearance of defendants before the Court. Moreover, it would seem counter-
productive to prohibit the Prosecutor from responding to allegations that
prosecutions are meritless, particularly because of the importance of having the
ICC's work perceived as legitimate by societies that have been affected by the crimes
that the OTP is prosecuting.254
244. Id. R. 3.6(b)(1).
245. Id. R. 3.6(b)(2).
246. See id. R. 3.6(b)(4) ("[A] lawyer may state the scheduling or result of any step in the litigation
247. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 3.6(b)(6) (2006) ("[A] lawyer may state... a
warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is reason to believe that there
exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest. . .. ").
248. See id. R. 3.8 cmt. 5 (noting that Model Rule 3.8, which governs prosecutors specifically, does not
restrict statements that could be made pursuant to Model Rule 3.6(b), which governs lawyers and publicity
generally).
249. Id. R. 3.6 cmt. 1.
250. Id. R. 3.6(c).
251. Id. R. 3.6 cmt. 7.
252. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 54(1)(b).
253. Id. art. 5(1).
254. See supra Part I(B); see also Turner, Legal Ethics, supra note 5, at 694 (noting that international
criminal trials aspire to promote peace and reconciliation).
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One potential concern-acknowledged in the commentary to Model Rule 3.8-
is that "a prosecutor's extrajudicial statement can create the additional problem of
increasing public condemnation of the accused."... This would be of particular
concern for the ICC. Defendants at the ICC are not charged with mere violations of
criminal law-they are accused of "crimes of concern to the international community
as a whole"1 6-and public statements by the Prosecutor might bring even more
condemnation to ICC defendants, who are presumed innocent under the ICC Statute
until proven guilty by the Prosecutor."' Given the high-profile nature of the
Prosecutor's work, his statements are bound to have a lasting effect on the
perception of the accused even if the Prosecutor ultimately fails to convict him or
her.
Nevertheless, the mere fact that certain types of statements may bring
condemnation to ICC defendants would seem to be a poor reason to entirely prohibit
the Prosecutor from making any public statements concerning ICC defendants and
cases. As a practical matter, the "public condemnation of the accused" may be
inevitable when the charges at issue involve crimes such as genocide. Moreover,
given that it will ultimately be ICC judges who adjudicate the guilt of ICC
defendants, not the public, the risk of prejudice from any public statements made by
the Prosecutor also is lessened, although perhaps not entirely eliminated.5 8
Finally, the Prosecutor, like defense counsel, also should avoid making any
public statements that would bring the Court into disrepute.25 9 The duty to avoid
making such statements is especially significant if one accepts that ICC trials should
have a "demonstration effect" on societies seeking to further the rule of law.26 The
Prosecutor's misleading claims concerning the Pre-Trial Chamber's findings against
Mr. Al-Bashir arguably would have violated such a provision because they tended to
suggest that the Court had adjudicated Mr. Al-Bashir's guilt without Mr. Al-Bashir
having appeared before the Court.
I propose the following draft rule, which seeks to balance the Prosecutor's duty
of impartiality with his need to obtain assistance from the public regarding the
investigation and prosecution of crimes:
255. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 5 (2006).
256. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 5(1).
257. Id. art. 66(1)-(2).
258. See Jonathan M. Moses, Legal Spin Control: Ethics and Advocacy in the Court of Public
Opinion, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1811, 1816-17 (1995) (suggesting that prohibitions against extrajudicial
speech by attorneys arose out of concerns relating to finding neutral jurors).
259. See Code for Counsel, supra note 22, art. 24(1) ("Counsel shall take all necessary steps to ensure
that his or her actions or those of counsel's assistants or staff are not prejudicial to the ongoing
proceedings and do not bring the Court into disrepute."). The Prosecutor arguably should have a higher
duty because of his role in the search "to establish the truth." ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 54(1). See
also Triffterer, supra note 75, at 1078 ("Article 54 sets the goal as an effort to establish the truth."); ICTY
Standards, supra note 7, art. 1 ("[Tlhe duties and responsibilities of the Prosecutor differ from, and are
broader than, those of defense counsel."). The Draft OTP Code goes beyond the prohibition in the Code
for Counsel as it requires the Prosecutor to "[t]ake all necessary steps to ensure that his or her actions do
not bring proceedings before the Court into disrepute." Draft OTP Code, supra note 8, art. 7(8)
(emphasis added).
260. See Stromseth, supra note 60, at 262 (suggesting that the "demonstration effects" of criminal
trials can "build public confidence that justice can be fair").
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Draft Conduct Rule Regarding Extrajudicial Statements
(1) The Prosecutor shall be prohibited from making statements that
are prejudicial to ongoing proceedings or bring the Court into
211disrepute.26
(2) The Prosecutor also shall avoid making public comments outside
of the courtroom including, inter alia, speaking to the media about
the merits of particular cases or the guilt or innocence of certain
accused before judgment by the Court, and making any public
statements regarding the character, credibility, reputation, or record
of an accused or any witness.262
(3) Notwithstanding (2) above, the Prosecutor may provide factual
information concerning: (i) the charges facing the accused to the
extent that such statements are necessary to inform the public of the
nature and extent of the Prosecutor's action26 3 and are intended to
aid in the investigation of crimes or to encourage compliance with
arrest warrants issued by the Pre-Trial Chamber or (ii) the merits of
a particular case when provided in response to publicity that tends
to undermine the perception of the Office of the Prosecutor if such
adverse publicity was not initiated by the Prosecutor and the
statement made pursuant to this paragraph is limited to such
information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse
publicity.2 6
Although some segments of the ICC may prefer a presumptive ban on
extrajudicial speech, the rule proposed here would have precluded the Prosecutor
from misstating the nature of the Pre-Trial Chamber's findings concerning Mr. Al-
Bashir's alleged crimes while still allowing him to make public statements that could
mitigate misimpressions about the OTP's work and encourage compliance with the
Al-Bashir warrant.
CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to argue that legal ethics are of central importance to
international criminal law. Although the ICC has adopted codes of conduct for
judges and defense counsel, no such code of conduct exists for the OTP. This is
regrettable, and some of the OTP's most controversial actions-from its over-
reliance on confidentiality agreements, to its refusal to comply with orders from the
Lubanga Trial Chamber and the Prosecutor's decision to publish an editorial
concerning Sudanese President Al-Bashir-can be attributed in part to the absence
of an ethical framework for ICC prosecutors.
A code of conduct cannot and should not eliminate prosecutorial discretion.
However, the ethical dilemmas discussed in this Article are familiar in domestic
261. Code for Counsel, supra note 22, art. 24(1).
262. Cf id. ("Counsel shall take all necessary steps to ensure that his or her actions or those of
counsel's assistants or staff are not prejudicial to the ongoing proceedings and do not bring the Court into
disrepute.").
263. MODEL RULES OF PROF'LCONDucT R. 3.8(f) (2006).
264. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6(c) (2006).
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contexts, and the OTP should have addressed them in the course of developing an
OTP code of conduct prior to the commencement of the ICC's first trials.2 65 The
current state of affairs, where the Appeals Chamber has been called upon to
determine what the Prosecutor's obligations should be, is unsustainable and has
brought unfortunate controversy to the Court. Nor has the Appeals Chamber fully
resolved the Prosecutor's conflicting duties of (i) investigation and disclosure and (ii)
independence and compliance with Chambers. The OTP's public statements remain
entirely unregulated.
Although the rules proposed in this Article need not be incorporated directly
into an OTP code of conduct, there is strong reason to believe that the OTP requires
specific rules that go beyond the abstract standards reflected, for example, in the
Draft OTP Code and ICTY Standards for Prosecutors. The diversity of legal
backgrounds in the OTP, the high profile nature and permanence of its work, and the
belief that prosecutions should serve some educative purpose suggest that very
specific rules of conduct are needed to create clear expectations for OTP attorneys
that may differ markedly from the expectations in domestic systems. A code of
conduct will not eliminate the possibility of the OTP taking controversial actions in
the future. Nevertheless, if developed in concert with other organs of the Court, it
can help to establish relatively clear norms of conduct and provide some prospective
guidance as to how ICC prosecutors should address instances of conflicting duties in
the future.
For international criminal law to achieve all of its objectives, prosecutors at
international criminal tribunals like the ICC must pay greater attention to the ethical
dimensions of their actions. Thus far, by engaging in questionable acts such as
refusing to comply with orders and misrepresenting actions taken by the Court, the
OTP's actions have undermined the Court's early work. The ICC cannot further the
rule of law without demanding that its employees not only advocate respect for the
rule of law, but embody it.
265. Professor Whiting has suggested that the disclosure issue was particularly foreseeable. See
Whiting, supra note 112, at 209 ("[Olne of the most remarkable aspects of this story was its inevitability.
The conflict that arose between the Prosecution's right to obtain confidential 'lead' evidence pursuant to
Article 54(3)(e) and its responsibility to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence under Article 67(2) is
built right into the Statute of the ICC . . . .").
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